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The European Court of Justice and the

U.S. Supreme Court: Parallels in
Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence
By

STEVEN

A.

BBAS*

I. INTRODUCION
Despite the silence of the European Community Treaties on human
rights, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has expounded a set of fundamental rights drawn from the laws and treaties of the Member States,
moral principles, and the aims of the European Community (EC). 1
While some of the ECJ's jurisprudence has reduced national autonomy,
national courts have generally accepted and applied the resulting rules of
Community law. Most academics describe the Court's human rights policy as promoting justice and reassuring national courts as to their autonomy while preserving Community powers.2 To do so, the ECJ has gone
beyond the express provisions of the treaties to construe them purpos3
ively. Most commentators implicitly approve of this activism.
However, one influential Danish scholar, Hjalte Rasmussen, sees the
ECJ's activism as having weakened its credibility. Rasmussen assails the

ECJ for overstepping its bounds and proposes a more limited judicial
* Yale Law School, Class of 1994; Honours B.A., University College, Oxford, 1991;
B.A., Columbia, 1989. The author would like to thank Nigel Ashford, Eric Barendt, Stephen
Davies, John Finnis, Stephen Macedo, Sheldon Richman, Bernard Rudden, Jeremy Shearmur,
Stephen M. Sheppard, Alyssa Grikscheit, C. Bradley Thompson, Alan Tyrrell, and Derrick
Wyatt for their advice and criticisms of earlier drafts. I am indebted to the Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University for its continued support and assistance throughout
the writing of this article.
1. Though the salient differences are obvious, this Comment will use 'state,' 'nations,'
'federalism,' and 'Founders' in discussing both the U.S. and the EC.
2. See, eg., Mauro Cappelletti, Is the European Courtof Justice Running Wild?, 12 EuR.
L. REv. 3 (1987).
3. For a good introduction to the history, structure, and politics of the EC, see TREVOR
C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (2d ed. 1988). For a
more topical approach to EEC law, see DERRICK WYATr & ALAN DASHWOOD, THE SunSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC (2d ed. 1987). For a deeper look at human rights, see Joseph

H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European
Courtof Justice in the Protection of FundamentalHuman Rights within the Legal Order of the
European Community, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1081, 1112 (1986).
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This Comment summarizes Rasmussen's objections to the ECJ's activism and responds to them. Because Rasmussen draws illuminating
parallels with the development of U.S. Supreme Court activism, this
Comment also will use the American situation to show similarities in
federal development but will defend the ECJ. Furthermore, this Comment will critique Robert Bork's book, The Tempting of America, which
criticizes the U.S. Supreme Court's activism Bork fears judicial discretion even more than Rasmussen. This Comment argues, however, that
discretion does not equal complete textual license as long as judges heed
textual and contextual constraints. By analyzing similarities between the
EC and U.S. high courts and by discussing methods of constitutional
interpretation, this Comment will contend that judicial discretion is inevitable and need not lead to unbridled license.
Part II of this Comment provides a general overview of EC law and
the ECJ. Part III discusses the ECJ's development of rights through an
examination of its case law. Part IV examines the historical similarities
between the early U.S. Supreme Court and the ECJ. Part V summarizes
and criticizes Rasmussen's position on ECJ activism, while Part VI similarly discusses Bork's view of the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence.
Finally, Part VII argues for a purposive theory of constitutional
interpretation.
II.
A.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: BACKGROUND

The Creation and Structure of EC Law

In the aftermath of World War II, six European nations sought to
prevent future war by fostering interdependence. They first chose coal
and steel, the essential materials for war, and formed the European Coal
and Steel Community (ECSC), in 1952. Next, trade and atomic energy
was addressed by the creation of the European Economic Community
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) in
1958. Proponents of EEC union envisioned a United States of Europe
based on the concept "unify their pocketbooks and their hearts and
minds will follow." 6 Now, despite nationalist qualms, the twelve Mem4. HIJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING (1986). Rasmussen never explicitly
claims the Danish courts as his ideal, but he nevertheless seems to revere the Danish model of
judicial restraint.
5. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF

THE LAW (1990).

6. Bernard Rudden, Lecture at Oxford University (Apr. 1990).

Cf WYATT &
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ber States find themselves drawn together as the 1992 deadline for a common market approaches.
To foster a common market, the Treaties formed a new legal order.
While Member States retain autonomy in most internal matters and the
more fundamental external matters, the system is both proto-federal and

supranational, not purely international. The EC decides many issues by
majority vote instead of the unanimity required in classical international
law. 7
The Treaties resemble a constitution: many clauses are vague and
broad, others detailed.' The 1967 Merger Treaty fused the organs of the

three Communities (EEC, ECSC, and Euratom) into the EC, but each
Community still relies on a separate, though similarly worded, treaty. 9
supra note 3, at 3-12. After an attempt to create the European Defense Community and the European Political Community failed, the drafters saw the EC as a more gradual
way to foster harmony.
7. HARTLEY, supranote 3, at 11-12. The acceptance of majority rule after the end of the
transitional period is crucial: it signals a willingness to be governed by others and cede unprecedented sovereignty in order to reap the fruits of interdependence.
8. This Comment does not consider why a Bill of Rights was omitted from the Treaties.
The Treaties' prepatory documents (travauxpreparatoires)are kept secret, so that one cannot
substantiate any such speculation. Rasmussen rightly dismisses the hypotheses that the drafters thought the issue irrelevant or failed to consider it. Instead, he suggests that they intentionally left the protection of rights to "the individual Member State's Bill of Rights."
RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 390.
Though he bases his reasoning solely on considerations of political expediency, his argument is plausible. However, he downplays the possibility that the drafters simply considered
rights infringements unlikely due to the EC's economic nature. See also Pierre Pescatore, The
Protection of Human Rights in the European Communities, 9 COMMON Mr.T. L. REv. 73
(1972).
The impossibility of agreeing upon a Bill may have contributed to the omission. See Manfred A. Dauses, The Protectionof FundamentalRights in the Community Legal Order, 10 EUR.
L. REv. 398, 399 (1985) (noting that the failure to ratify the European Defense Community
and the European Political Community may have encouraged the High Contracting Parties to
shy away from potentially contentious issues). Further, the fear that enumerating rights would
have allowed the EC to extend its powers up to the limits of those rights may have also contributed to the omission. Weiler, supranote 3, at 1112 (citing the American parallel). Finally,
diplomats may have thought the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
(Eur. Cony. on H.R.) and U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights would suffice. Note
that the European Political Community Treaty incorporated Section I and the First Protocol
of the Eur. Conv. on MR. and was never ratified. WYATT & DASHwOOD, supra note 3, at 7.
9. In most cases, the relevant provisions are identical, since the EEC and Euratom were
modelled upon the ECSC. Thus the observations in this Comment will, unless noted otherwise, apply to all three Communities. Note that, despite these similarities there are some important differences in wording, based in part on the lessons learned in the first years of the
ECSC. For some such differences, see, e.g., TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 215(2); TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY [EURATOM TREATY] art. 188 (noncontractual liability); and
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY [ECSC TREATY]
DAsHwooD,
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The opening sections of the Treaties outline the aims of the Commu-

nities. In the name of "civilisation" and "peaceful relations," the High
Contracting Parties "resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging of their essential interests" and to "give direction to a destiny henceforward shared." 1 They further "resolved to ensure the economic and

social progress of their countries by common action" towards "the essential objective" of "the constant improvement of the living and working
conditions of their peoples" and sought "to preserve and strengthen
peace and liberty."1 1 Pursuant to the Preambles, the opening articles set

out such aims as harmonious policies and a common market;12 the four
freedoms of movement of goods, labor, services, and capital; 1 3 and the
'14
rule barring "any discrimination on grounds of nationality."

The Treaties afford isolated protections for individual rights, but
contain no Bill of Rights.

5

However, three vague Treaty articles suggest

the adoption of unwritten legal principles by analogy to other legal systems. 6 Article 164 of the EEC Treaty (paralleled in ECSC Treaty article
31 and Euratom Treaty article 136) outlines the Court's power: "The

Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of
this Treaty the law is observed."' 7 Articles 173 of the EEC Treaty, 33 of
the ECSC Treaty, and 146 of the Euratom Treaty allow annulment of
measures for "infringement of an essential procedural requirement, [or]

infringement of this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application."

8

Finally, article 215(2) of the EEC Treaty and article 188 of the

art. 40(1) (faute de service). Since the EEC and Euratom Treaties were drawn up and ratified
at the same time, they are very much similar in the areas under discussion, though not, of
course, in subject matter. The Treaties use the terms 'High Contracting Parties,' EEC
TREATY art. 1, and 'Member States,' EEC TREATY art. 2, to refer to the twelve nations which
belong to the EC: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 3-5.
10. ECSC TREATY preamble.
11. EEC TREATY preamble.
12. EEC TREATY arts. 2, 8; ECSC TREATY arts. 2-3.
13. EEC TREATY art. 3.
14. EEC TREATY art. 7.
15. See generally R. Bernhardt, The Problems ofDrawing Up a Catalogue of Fundamental
Rights for the European Community, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, No. 5 (Supp. 1976) at 23,
Such rights include the rights to move freely to other Member States to work, EEC TREATY
arts. 48-51, and to equal pay for equal work, id. art. 119.
16. This development will be discussed infra, at notes 26-87 and accompanying text.
17. EEC TREATY art. 164. ECSC Treaty article 31 has an additional clause after "this
Treaty," which is "and of the rules laid down for the implementation thereof...." The phrase
"the law is observed" is a translation of the original French phrase "respect du droit." As
Derrick Wyatt has pointed out, the word "droit" implicitly suggests the inclusion of unwritten
law. Derrick Wyatt, Comments on Manuscript 5 (Oct. 1990) (on file with the author).
18. EEC TREATY art. 173; ECSC TREATY art. 33; EURATOM TREATY art. 146,
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Euratom Treaty base noncontractual liability on "the general principles
common to the laws of the Member States." 19
B. The Functions of the European Court of Justice
The Treaties assign several roles to the ECJ. It hears cases brought
directly by the Commission or other States concerning a State's failure to
fulfill Treaty obligations.2' The Court also judicially reviews Community
acts.21 More commonly, under article 177 of the EEC Treaty it issues
what amount to preliminary advisory opinions to national courts on the
interpretation of the Treaties and secondary EC acts and the validity of
secondary EC acts.'
In each case, the Court employs an Advocate General, an impartial
jurist who summarizes the issues and precedents and offers the Court a
preliminary opinion.' The Advocate General's opinion in no way binds
the ECJ.
Two concepts, both developed in the mid-1960s, have been crucial
in the development of the Community legal order: direct effect and
supremacy. The doctrine of direct effect, first announced in Van Gend en
Loos, holds that rules of EC law which are sufficiently clear and unconditional and which require no further implementing measures are self-executing and enforceable in national courts. 24 The doctrine of supremacy,
first developed in Costa v. ENEL, declares that EC law is to be supreme
in those areas covered by the EC treaties.25

M.

The Case Law of the ECJ

The EC's development of general principles of law presaged the
recognition of human rights guarantees. A brief examination of the
Court's adoption of these general principles will illuminate the subse19.
20.
21.
22.

EEC TREATY
EEC TREATY
EEC TREATY
EEC TREATY

art. 215(2); EURATOM TREATY art. 188.
arts. 169-170.
arts. 173, 175.
art. 177. This route has permitted the human rights issues to emerge

because it circumvents the standing requirement which individuals otherwise face. In other
actions, individuals must establish that the measure was addressed directly to them or was of
direct and individual concern to them, a standard difficult to satisfy.

23. Although the Court does not have a formal doctrine ofstare decis, courts, and especially Advocates General, pay attention to what they have written previously. See HARTLEY,
supra note 3,at 75-76. Thus, although this Comment will use such terms as "overrule" for
convenience, technically, such concepts do not apply to the FCJ.
24. See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin., 1963
E.C.R. 1, at 13, 2 C.M.L.1. 105 (1963). See generally HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 185-rn.
25. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 3 C.M.L.R. 425 (1964).
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quent adoption of human rights assurances. The Court's development of
fundamental human rights will then be chronicled and analyzed.
A.

General Principles of Law

As noted, article 173 of the EEC Treaty mentions "essential procedural requirement[s]" and other "rule[s] of law" but does not define
them. A commentator notes that "there are many customary rules, considered to be so self-evident, though of insufficient importance for codification.., that they are applied by the Court more or less as a matter of
course." 26 These rules flow from the Member States' "common legal
heritage." 27
The earliest case to recognize such rules was Fddration Charbon-

niere.2" In that case, the plaintiff (applicant) invoked the principle of
proportionality, which requires that means be proportional to ends, to

challenge an ECSC decision fixing coal prices. Proportionality, though
not found in the Treaties, exists in the German Constitution. Advocate
General Lagrange and the Court agreed that it is "a generally accepted
rule of law" that a reaction "must be in proportion to" the problem at
hand.2 9 The ECJ justified the use of this principle: "the rules laid down

by an international treaty or law presuppose the rules without which that
treaty or law would have no meaning or could not be reasonably and
usefully applied." 3 Similarly, the Court held that an act ought to cause

31
no more harm than strictly necessary to achieve its goals.
In a subsequent line of cases, the Advocate General and ECJ recog-

nized the existence of three inter-related principles.-the protection of
26. HENRY G. SCHERMERS, JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
35 (3d ed. 1979).
27. Id
28. Case 8/55, Federation Charbonniere v. High Authority of the European Coal and
Steel Community, 1956 E.C.R. 245.
29. Id at 299.
30. Id. The Court held proportionality to be such a rule. On the facts, however, it found
no violation. The Court explained that such a method is "without ... recourse to a wide
interpretation" and is "a rule of interpretation generally accepted in both international and
national law." Id It implied that the principle was to be found in all of the Member States
but did not conduct a detailed comparative evaluation.
31. Case 15/57, Compagnie des Hauts Fourneaux de Chasse v. High Authority of the
European Coal and Steel Community, 1958 E.C.R. 211, 228 (company refused to join an
ECSC ferrous scrap fund and pay dues, pleading that more harm than necessary was being
inflicted. E.C.J. rejected the latter contention on the facts). See also Case 114/76, Bela-Milhle
Josef Bergman v. Grows-Farm, 1977 E.C.R. 1211, 25 C.M.L.R. 83 (1979) (the "Skimmed
Milk Powder Case"), in which the offending requirement that animal feed incorporate expen.
sive milk powder to relieve the milk glut was struck down as needlessly harmful as well as
discriminatory.
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legal rights, the protection of legitimate expectations, and the rule against
retroactivity-but held them to be subject to limitations.3 2 In CNTA, the
applicant challenged the Community's sudden abolition of a monetary
compensation system (designed to cushion businesses against currency
fluctuations) for having broken these three rules. Advocate General
Trabucchi wrote that the violation was not sufficiently severe, but the
Court held that "in the absence of an overriding matter of public interest,
the Commission has violated a superior rule of law."3 3
One year after Britain's accession to the EC, the Court drew upon
English principles for the first time in proclaiming the procedural requirement of the right to be heard in the Transocean case. 4 Although
the applicant, in challenging an EEC regulation, had not specifically
pleaded this ground, Advocate General Warner invoked the English concept of natural justice, which is similar to the American concept of procedural due process. He found parallels in the laws of other Member
States (except for Italy and the Netherlands) and suggested that the regulation violated the right to a hearing.35 The Court adopted his reasoning. 36 Apart from the oddity of basing a ruling upon a ground not
32. Case 1/73, Westzucker GmbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur Zucker, 1973 E.C.R.
723 (certificate promising expert refund adjustment may have vested a right to an increased
refund); Case 62/70, Firma Werner A. Bock v. Commission of the European Communities,
1971 E.C.R. 897, 11 C.M.L.R. 160 (1972) (the "Chinese Mushroom Case") (in retroactively
blocking import of Chinese mushrooms, the goal was of negligible importance, and did not
justify retroactivity) (see especially Advocate General Dutheillet de Lamothe's submissions);
Case 81/72, European Community Commission v. European Community Council, 1973
E.C.R. 575, 584, 12 C.M.L.R. 639, 657 (1973) (the "staff salaries" case) (despite Advocate
General Warner's protests about a legislature's inability to bind its future will, the E.CJ. held
that the Council's planning a pay raise scheme created expectations and hence "assumed obligations"); Case 2/75, Einfuhr-und Vorratstelle fur Getreide v. Mackprang, 1975 E.C.R. 607,
623, 19 C.M.L.R. 198 (1977) (Advocate General Warner) (legitimate expectations do not protect profiteering from loopholes in EC grain intervention scheme); Case 74/74, Comptoir National Technique Agricole (CNTA) S.A. v. Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 533. On retroactivity,
see Case 63/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk, 1984 E.C.R. 2689, 2719, 41 C.M.LR. 522 (1984) (EC
could not retroactively authorize UK's imposition of national penal sanctions in fishing, which
falls within EC sphere); Frangois Lamoureux, The Retroactiviy of Community Acts in the Case
Law of the Court ofJustice,20 COMMON MKT. L.REv. 269 (1983). Note that all three principles are different facets of the concept of legal certainty.
33. Case 74/74, CNTA, 1975 E.C.R. at 550.
34. Case 17/74, Sadolin and Hoimblad Transocean Marine Paint Assn. v. European
Community Commission, 1974 E.C.R. 1063, 14 C.M.LR. 459 (1974) (EEC regulation struck
down for imposing a hidden condition upon the extension of an exemption from antitrust rules
under EEC Treaty article 85(3). This concealment violated the right to be heard; applicant
only contended that the Commission acted ultra vires and in infringement of an essential procedural requirement) 1974 E.C.R. at 1087-88, 14 C.M.L.R. at 468-69.
35. 1974 E.C.R. at 1088-89, 14 C.M.L.R. at 469-71 (Advocate General Warner).
36. 1974 E.C.R. at 1079-80, 14 C.M.L.R. at 477.
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pleaded by the parties, Transocean is notable for adopting a legal rule
nonexistent in two Member States. Transocean is also noteworthy because the English concept of natural justice is not rooted in any statute or
code. Thus, the Court's willingness to recognize this common-law principle demonstrates its ability to look beyond written constitutions.3 7
Other principles adopted by the Court in similar comparative law
fashion include double jeopardy, good faith, force majeure, and unjust
enrichment.3 8
In applying the above general principles, the Court balances individual rights against the general welfare. In the cases, the terms "justification"-and "necessity" recur frequently. Although the Court tries to
interpret measures so as to respect these rules, "it has allowed real exceptions" to these general principles of law "where the general interest made
39
it imperative.
B. Fundamental Rights
The ECJ has never explicitly articulated a test for determining what
constitutes a right or which rights are fundamental. The Court's reliance
on the constitutional traditions of all twelve Member States has led to a
fairly broad, inclusive tradition. Since most constitutions incorporate
guarantees of life, liberty, and property, the ECJ has treated all such
rights as fundamental.
1. The Emergence of Fundamental Rights
Although the ECJ readily incorporated natural justice into Community law, it initially rejected national guarantees of rights as grounds for
annulling Community enactments. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the
power of the EC was shaky, and the Court struggled tp assert its
supremacy. In one case it dismissed an appeal to Ge:rman constitutional
37. On English common-law freedoms specifically, see SIR ALFRED DENNING, FREEDOM
UNDER THE LAW (5th ed. 1952).
38. See, eg., SCHERMERS, supra note 26, at 32, 50-51, and John A. Usher, The Influence

of National Concepts on Decisions of the European Court, 1 EUR. L. REv. 359, 367-68 (1976)
(also suggesting estoppel). On double jeopardy, see Case 7/72, Boehringer Manheim GmbH v.
Commission of European Communities, 1972 E.C.R. 1281, 14 C.M.L.R. 864 (1973) (especially
the submissions of Advocate General Mayras) and Case 14/68 Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt,
1969 E.C.R. 15, 8 C.M.L.R. 100 (1969). Onforce majeure specifically, see Michael Akchurst,
The Application of GeneralPrinciplesofLaw by the Courtof Justiceof the European Comm unities, 52 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 29, 47 (1981).
39. Lamoureux, supra note 32, at 296. The position on retroactivity is not crystal clear
except regarding penal sanctions. See the further discussion of balancing infra notes 135-145
and accompanying text. All the cases referred to in note 32 mention balancing.
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guarantees as irrelevant to autonomous Community law;

°

inanother

case it ignored an applicant's appeal to "basic principles governing all
member countries."'"
Despite the ECJ's rejection of such arguments, on two occasions the
Advocates General hinted that national rights could have an indirect influence on EC law. In the first Nold case,4 2 Advocate General Roemer

dismissed the appeal to German constitutional rights but did not exclude
"having regard to fundamental legal principles which are also to be
' The next year, in
found in the provisions of national constitutions."43

the Ruhrkohlen cases,14 the applicant claimed that the EC's dismantling
of coal cartels violated vested German rights. The Court strenuously op-

posed such use of national rights, but Advocate General Lagrange was
less categorical: "It is not for the Court... to apply, or at least to do so

directly, rules of national law, even constitutional rules[,]" but such rules
may express "a general principle of law which may be taken into consideration in applying the Treaty."4

Political realities necessitated the Court's hard line, because at this
early stage in the Community's development, the Court had to claim jurisdiction, promote unity, and seek uniformity. Varying standards of na-

tional protection would have blocked European union. Yet even then,
Lagrange hinted that EC law could accomodate national rights guarantees if courts administered such protection as part of uniform and sovereign EC law.
By the end of the 1960s, the ECY had asserted successfully the
supremacy and direct effect of Community law, thus solidifying its

power. Hence, the Court was prepared to build upon Lagrange's
40. Case 1/58, Stork v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1959
E.C.R. 17 (applicant's challenge to decision protecting cartels on grounds of fundamental
rights of free trade in member states dismissed).
41. Case 40/64, Sgarlata v. Commission of the E.E.C., 1965 E.C.R. 215,227,5 C.M.LR.
314, 324 (1966) (applicant sought annulment of price-fixing of citrus on grounds of "basic
principles" of Member States; this claim was ignored). Stork and Sgarlata phrased claims as
national rights; ten years later, similar claims were allowed when treated as EC rights inspired
by analogy. See, eg., Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 19
C.M.L.R. 112 (1970).
42. Case 18/57, Nold KG v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community,
1959 E.C.R. 41 (rules change prevented firm from achieving coal wholesaler status; it alleged
constitutional violation, but Advocate General said scope of E.C.J. limited to EC law).
43. Id. at 73-74.
44. Joined Cases 36, 37, 38, and 40/59 Ruhrkohlen v. High Authority of the European
Coal and Steel Community, 1960 E.C.R. 423.
45. Id at 450 (Advocate General Lagrange) (emphasis in original, suggesting that
Lagrange contemplated and supported the inspiration of EC law by Member States rights).
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Ruhrkohlen dictum.' In the Stauder case, the plaintiff challenged the
German translation of an EEC decision 47 requiring that he give his name
in order to receive surplus butter. He claimed the requirement was con-

trary to the right of human dignity enshrined in the German Constitution. Although the Court decided the case by remedying a mistaken
translation, Advocate General Roemer remarked that certain unwritten
rules of law could be used if founded on comparative evaluation of the
laws of the Member States. 48 The Court recognized such unwritten
rights in one sentence: "Interpreted in this way the provision at issue
contains nothing capable of prejudicing the fundamental human rights
enshrined in the general principles of Community law and protected by
49
the Court."
The Court fleshed out this doctrine in the InternationaleHandelsgesellschaft case, 5° in which the applicants challenged an EEC regulation requiring forfeiture of an export-license deposit upon failure to

export on grounds of proportionality. Before referring the question to
the ECJ, the Administrative Court Chamber of Frankfurt examined the
validity of the measure and held that it violated German constitutional
rights of business and property.5 Advocate General Dutheillet de

Lamothe "rejected categorically" the suggestion that an EC right could
be based directly upon national law. Nonetheless, he then stated:
Does that mean that the fundamental principles of national legal systems have no function in Community law? No. They contribute to
forming that philosophical,political and legal substratum common to
46. Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R. 419, 9 C.M.L.R. 112 (1970).
47. A "decision" is an EC legislative measure binding only on the person to whom it Is
addressed, as opposed to a "regulation", which binds all persons and Member States. EEC
TREATY

art. 189.

48. See W.R. Edeson & F. Wooldridge, European Community Law and Fundamental
Human Rights: Some Recent Decisions of the European Court and National Courts, 1976/1
LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRAUON 1, 7-8. Advocate General Roemer did not elaborate upon
the comparative legal method because the instant case did not require its application.
49. Strauder,1969 E.C.R. at 42, 9 C.M.L.R. at 119. This was the first recognition of such
rights by the E.C.J. and left room for subsequent development. At the time, "general principles of law" had no clear-cut meaning in this context; the term appears in EEC Treaty article
215(2) without definition, and its eventual definition can only be gleaned from subsequent
cases. Surprisingly, the definition, as opposed to the scope, of this term has attracted little
attention; people seem to have understood it generally as procedural rules and human rights,
Furthermore, this sentence in the original French version of the judgment uses exactly the
language of EEC Treaty article 164, though the Court does not openly cite the Treaty. M.H.
Mendelson, The European Court of Justice and Human Rights, 1 Y.B. EUR. L. 125, 131
(1981).
50. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle flr
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 11 C.M.L.R. 255 (1972).
51. Edeson & Wooldridge, supra note 48, at 9,16.

19921

Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence

the Member-States from which emerges through the case law an unwritten Community law, one of the essential aims of which is precisely
to ensure the respect for the fundamental rights of the individual. 52

Drawing upon FidirationCharbonniereand Chasse and interpreting

them as cases guaranteeing rights, Dutheillet de Lamothe posited that
both general principles and articles 39 and 40 of the EEC Treaty guaran-

tee proportionality. The ECJ agreed that national courts could not review the validity of Community measures against any national law
because of the EC's autonomy and the need for uniform enforcement. It
then sought to mollify the German courts by finding a rule of proportion-

ality: "The protection of [fundamental] rights, whilst inspired by the
constitutional traditions common to the Member-States must be ensured
within the framework of the structure and objectives of the Community."53 On the facts, however, the Court found no violation of the proportionality principle.

The Court's ruling did not end the matter, because the Administrative Court stated that it was not bound by this preliminary ruling, insisted that it could test Community laws against the German
Constitution, and referred the matter to the German Federal Constitu-

tional Court.'

In a four to three decision, the Federal Constitutional

Court held that directly applicable secondary EC law could not prevail
over rights in the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). It also stated that

Germany could not transfer responsibility for protecting such rights as
long as the EC lacked a codified Bill of Rights and a democratically
elected Parliament capable of legislating."
In a similar case challenging an EC levy, the Italian Constitutional
Court deferred to the ECJ but implicitly reserved the right to strike
down the Treaties themselves should the Community violate human
52. Handelsgesellschaft, 1970 E.C.R. at 1146, 11 CM.L.R. at 270, 271 (1972) (emphasis
added). One can resolve the apparent paradox when one remembers that the E.CJ. is asserting authority. Thus, the Court accepts such rights insofar as it recognizes them within EC law
(hence making itself supreme arbiter of EC rights), and does not accept national rights per se
but instead sees in them elements of the foundation of law.
53. 1970 E.C.R. at 1134, 11 C.M.L.R. at 283. Note that "principles" and "traditions" are
both acceptable interpretations of the French word patrimoine found in the decision.
54. In such situations, the national court is supposed to act upon and apply without question the answer given by the E.CJ. to the preliminary reference. Hence, the voicing of disagreement and further referral constituted wholesale defiance of the Community legal order and
threatened to disrupt the relationship between the court systems.
55. Edeson & Wooldridge, supra note 48 at 34, 38, 41. Since the European Parliament
lacks power, there is little democratic input but why should a majoritarian institution afford
any greater protection to minority rights? Furthermore, since the German courts are themselves zealous in protecting rights, this cannot be an objection to rights activism per se but
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56

Such insistence upon national protection and review threatened to
destroy the legal integration essential for economic and political union.
Fearing a rebellion of the national courts, the ECJ sought to present itself
as guardian of an uncodified, but nonetheless secure, catalog of rights
and freedoms.57
Soon thereafter, the second Nold case, also from Germany, challenged a regulation as violating fundamental rights. Xn that case, Advocate General Trabucchi reaffrmed the importance of "inspiration from
the common traditions" of the States in guaranteeing ights such as property, equality, and proportionality "not expressly laid down" which nevertheless are:
those principles [for the sake of which all law has been established]: we
find them in the ancient laws, as the written basis of society, we find
them in the codes of the nineteenth century ... we now find them more
formally proclaimed in modem constitutions.... [They are] an indisputable characteristic of human personality. 58

Though these rights are fundamental and inalienable, one must distinmust be construed as a plea for a bill of rights and a democratic body in addition to judicial
protection.
The Commission reprimanded Germany for its threatened disobedience but took no further steps.
In 1986, the German Constitutional Court, after satisfying itself that the EC was adequately protecting rights, overruled its InternationaleHandelsgeselischaft holding in Re: The
Application of Wtinsche Handelsgesellschaft, 50 C.M.L.R. 225, 265 (BGH 1987) (Germany).
56. Frontini v. Ministero delle Finanze, 14 C.M.L.R. 372 (Corte Cost. 1974) (Italy), cited
in HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 227-28. Despite these proclamations, neither Constitutional
Court ever struck down any EC acts as contrary to the Constitution. But see SpA Fragd v.
Amministrazione dee Finanze, Decision No. 232 of 21 Apr., 1989, 72 RrVlsTA DI DiRITrO
INTERNAZIONALE 103 (1989) (hinting that the Italian Corte Constituzionalemight scrutinize
EC law for violations of fundamental rights), noted in 27 COMMON MxT. L. RnV. 83 (G.
Gaja), 97 (H. G. Schermers). Schermers provides a thoughtful, balanced analysis of the dilemma national courts face in deciding whether to interfere with E.C.J. decisions violating
rights. He recommends EC ratification of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights as a solution but realizes that this is unlikely to occur.
While the French Conseild'Etat has also been recalcitrant and rebellious, its defiance has
not been related to human rights. See HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 219-45, and Nicolo, 55
C.M.L.R. 173 (Conseil d'Etat 1990) (Fr.) (especially M. Frydman, who suggested that EC law
could never supersede French constitutional rules).
57. Commentators generally accept this view. See Weiler, supra note 3, at 1118-19, and
Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 402.
58. Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission of the European Communities 1974 E.C.R. 491, 514,
14 C.M.L.R. 338, 348-49 (1974) (applicant's claim, that a regulation requiring a certain volume of purchases to qualify as coal wholesaler violated property and economic activity rights,
was dismissed on merits). Though most, if not all, Member States share this view, this passage
considers the rights of humans as humans, i.e. as natural, and not merely civil, rights.

19921

Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence

guish inalienable rights from absolute rights. 59 Limitations may be "justified by the general interest," but the core of the right must remain

exempt from interference.' In finding that the regulation in question
was sufficiently justified, the ECJ agreed that the Community may impose "certain limits justified by the overall objectives pursued by the

Community, on condition that the substance of these rights is left untouched."61 This balancing approach resembles that applied by most
constitutional courts.
National law, while influencing Community law, does not mechanically determine it. Nevertheless, Advocate General Trabucchi's detailed
examination of German law in the Nold case demonstrates not only the
importance of textual sources for principles but also the politics of satis-

fying national courts.62

Rasmussen and other commentators have detected a shift from the
InternationaleHandelsgesellschaftapproach securing those rights "common to the member-States," 63 which they view as a lowest common denominator approach.6" They identify the second Nold case as securing
the greatest degree of individual rights protection to be found in any of
the Member States and suggest that Nold No. 2 actually overrules Inter-

nationale.6 The dictum about principles "common to the memberStates" is unclear. Rasmussen most likely reads far too much into this
lone phrase as requiring unanimity.6 6 If a shift did occur, however, it
59. 1974 E.C.R. at 514, 14 C.M.L.R. at 349.
60. Id.Cf Edeson & Wooldridge, supra note 48, at 28-29, 27 n.109. Note that Trabucchi
cites four German cases to defend the idea of the "core" of a right.
61. Nold, 1974 E.C.R. at 508, 14 C.M.L.R. at 354-55.
62. Edeson & Wooldridge, supra note 48, at 32-33. As mentioned in Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Assoc. v. Commission of European Communities, 1974 E.C.R. 1063, the
Court considers case law and uncodified conventions as well as written constitutions. France
and Britain both lack written, binding Bills of Rights yet both figure prominently in the
E.C.J.'s comparative legal surveys. Cf. Bernhardt, supra note 15.
63. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle fur
Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125. 11 C.M.L.R. 255 (1972).
64. Edeson & Wooldridge, supra note 48, at 29 n.119. Rasmussen also claims that the
Court should have developed rights earlier to pave the way for the Court's later activism.
Rasmussen, supra note 4, at 399. In fact, it worked the other way around: first the E.CJ. had
to assert supremacy and direct effect, and only then could it protect rights, secure in applying
them as EC and not as national law.
65. Edeson & Woolridge, supra note 48, at 29 n. 119.
66. The Court does not and cannot apply a maximalist position. Weiler makes the case
very forcefully and convincingly. Weiler, supra note 3, at 1127-28. See Pescatore, supra note 8,
at 79, SCHERMERS, supra note 26, at 29; Case 7/76, Industria Romana Carni e Aflini SpA v.
Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato, 1976 E.C.R. 1213, 1217 (Advocate General
Warner) which all uphold maximalist protection, but see Case 5/73, Balkan-Import Export
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Berlin-Packhof, 1973 E.C.R. 1091, 1130 and Bernhardt, supra note
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was probably an attempt to appease maverick national courts.
In the final landmark case, Hauer,67 the applicant, barred from
planting vines by an EEC regulation, challenged the regulation in terms
of German property and trade rights. The ECJ reinterpreted the question as one of EC principles. It conducted a detailed comparative examination of the German, Italian, and Irish Constitutions and the European
Convention on Human Rights. Based upon the property regulations permitted by all four documents, the Court concluded, that infringement of
property rights could be justified by the need to protect the general
interest.6 8
The ECJ's method of reasoning in Hauer is noteworthy. First, the
Court, looking at a range of sources such as EC Treaty provisions, national laws, and treaties, distills a general principle inductively, and then
deductively applies the principle to the case at hand. 69 The Advocate
General's reference to the European Convention on Human Rights is
also notable because the Communities are not signatories to the Convention, although the Member States are all parties to it. Although one
commentator suggests that the Community may be bound by the European Convention on Human Rights because its members are, others oppose this view as based on an incorrect understanding of international
15, at 50, 68-9, who points out that a maximalist cumulative position would paralyze the EC.
Akehurst notes that Warner's argument rests upon fallaciously applying international law and
would be unworkable if two rights clashed. Akehurst, supra note 38, at 44. Note two important considerations: 1) since these cases usually involve an individual or corporation against
the EC or a Member State, clashes of individual rights have not emerged except insofar as
"general good" subsumes individual rights of citizens, and 2) these principles are still limited
to the EC sphere; the E.C.J. is not inserting them into Member State law.
67. Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, 29 C.M.L.R. 42
(1980).
68. Such reinterpretation of claims of national rights as those of EC rights was not even
considered in Case 1/58, Stork v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community,
1959 E.C.R. 17; Cases 36, 37, 38 & 40/59, Ruhrkohlen, Verkaufsgesellschaft mbH v. High
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1969 E.C.R. 419; and Case 18/57,
Nold KG v. High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 1959 E.CR. 41.
Hauer was the first to cite explicitly a particular provision of the European Convention on
Human Rights. This development is notable because the Convention is an international treaty
signed by the Member States but unrelated to the EC per se.
69. See Case 118/75, The State v. Watson & Belman, 1976 E.C.R. 1185, 1198, 18
C.M.L.R 552 (1976) (E.C.J. used specific Treaty provisions and secondary EC law to reinforce
freedom of movement). The induction proceeds on the basis of provisions found in some of the
States, though not always all; hence the need for creativity. Because the States all share a
Western heritage, they are not radically at odds on basic rights as, for instance, a country
guaranteeing property would be with a Communist country forbidding private property. See
SCHERMERS, supra note 26, at 28-29 (a principle constitutionally guaranteed in one Member
State will, in practice, never be rejected or forbidden in another). However, to reconcile necessarily involves the modification of absolute principles and conflicting practices.
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law."° The better view is that since the EC is autonomous, the Convention should be utilized only by analogy and that use of the Convention is
"merely a reference to the general principles of which... they are a
specific expression.

2.

' 71
,

Those Rights Considered Fundamental

While Hauer involved classical negative rights to property and
trade, the ECJ has not ruled out the existence of positive rights (e.g.,
rights to welfare). In Testa, Maggio, and Vitale,12 three Italian workers
who had been collecting unemployment benefits in Germany lost them
upon returning to Italy and staying for more than three months. The
ECI and Advocate General Reischl held the time limits to be reasonable
and proportionate, but it left open the possibility that a right to property
could protect entitlement to social benefits.7 3 Reischl's emphasis on the
social aspect of economics may mark a shift from a liberal to a social
70. Pescatore, supra note 8, at 79; Bernhardt, supra note 15, at 51; Weiler, supra note 3, at
1134-35.
71. Case 118/75, Watson & Belmann, 1976 E.C.R. at 1207, 18 C.M.LR. at 552 (1976)
(Advocate General Trabucchi). See also Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975
E.C.R. 1219, 17 C.M.L.R. 140 (1976) (limitations on freedom of movement are "a specific
manifestation of a more general principle, enshrined in" the Eur. Cony. on H.R., 1975 E.C.R.
at 1232, 17 C.M.L.R. at 155. Some have used the assimilation of GATF in Cases 21-24/72,
International Fruit v.Produktschap, 1972 E.C.R. 1219, 16 C.M.L.R. 1 (1975), to suggest that
the Convention also be applied in the EC, but the situations are not analogous.
The question is probably moot in light of the non-binding EC Joint Declaration of the
European Parliament, the Council, and the Commission respecting the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights. 1977 OJ.(C 103) 1 reprintedin BERNARD RUDDEN &
DERRICK WYATr, BAsIc COMMUNITY LAWS 138 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter Joint Declaration]. It declares that, in light of the E.CJ.'s recognition of general principles of hw (including fundamental rights) drawn especially from the European Convention on Human Rights
and Member States' laws, the Community intends to respect these rights. In the early 1980s,
the Commission proposed that the EC should itself accede to the Convention. The European
Parliament also favored this approach, but the E.CJ. opposed this idea, fearing a court superior to itself. The proposal was never adopted. Though in theory there is the danger that the
two supra-national courts may issue conflicting judgments, in practice no such danger looms
on the horizon. The quieting down of proposals that the EC sign the Convention or promulgate its own Bill of Rights testifies to the effectiveness of the Court's rights policy as a safeguard and a symbol. Note that the Single European Act of 1986, while not formally adhering
to the Convention, proclaims in the third recital to its Preamble that the Member States are
"determined to work together to promote democracy on the basis of the fundamental rights
recognized in the constitutions and laws of the Member States, in the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter,
notably freedom, equality and social justice." Single European Act of 1986, 1987 OJ.(L 169)
2 [hereinafter SEA].
72. Cases 41, 121, and 796/79, Testa v. Bundesanstalt fiur Arbeit, 1980 E.C.R. 1979.
73. Id. at 1996-98 (E.CJ.), 2007-12 (Advocate General Reischl).
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conception of property;74 unfortunately, no later case has clarified the
matter.
The EEC Treaty, in articles 48-66, protects the free movement of
persons and services and the right of establishment in another Member
State. Rather than viewing these sections as merely maximizing economic efficiency, the Court has treated them as expressions of fundamental rights. In Rutili,75 France tried to limit the freedom of an Italian
citizen to reside in certain sections of France. The ECJ held that since
the freedom of movement is a fundamental freedom conferred by the
EEC Treaty, it would construe narrowly public policy exceptions under
article 48(3) of the EEC Treaty and ensure that derogations of this right
were proportionate to legitimate state aims.7 6 In the absence of a "genuine and sufficiently serious threat to public policy," the restrictions on
Rutili's movement were unjustified.7 7 Rather than performing a costbenefit analysis, the ECJ treated the right as a strong, albeit rebuttable,
presumption and invoked the proportionality test, which, as noted earlier, is an essential tool in checking abuses of governmental power.
The ECJ has also recognized freedom of religion as a fundamental
principle. In Prai,78 a Jewish woman complained because a hiring ex-

amination had been scheduled for a Jewish festival day. The Court dismissed her claim because she had not given the hiring authority notice
before the date had been fixed. 79 The Court remarked, however, that if
such a problem had come to the hiring authority's attention in due time,
it would have been obliged to take such difficulties into account.A0 Of
74. A liberal conception views property as what one already possesses and sees govcrn.
ment as necessary to protect that property. See generally JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF

GOVERNMENT 285-446 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed. 1680). In contrast, a social
conception of property embraces government entitlements and therefore insists on a more active government role. See generally Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733
(1964).
75. Case 36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, 17 C.M.L.R. 140
(1976).
76. 1975 E.C.R. at 1231-32, 17 C.M.L.R. at 154-58.
77. Id. See also Case 118/75, State v. Watson & Belmann, 1976 E.C.R. 1185, 1198, 18
C.M.L.R. 552 (1976) Note Trabucchi's dictum in Watson that the Court may indeed "create a
new right" but "it would be a sound rule to avoid the fiction of using the actual wording of tle
Treaty to justify the extension to all citizens of the Community of a right to freedom of movement .. .." 1976 E.C.R. at 1205, 18 C.M.L.R. at 561 (1976). The Court subsequently rejected
this reasoning; see Cases 286/82, 26/83, Luisi & Carbone v. Ministero del Tesoro, 1984 E.C.R.
377, 44 C.M.L.R. 57 (1985).
78. Case 130/75, Prais v. Council of the European Community, 1976 E.C.R. 1589, 18
C.M.L.R. 708 (1976).
79. 1976 E.C.R. at 1598-99, 18 C.M.L.R. at 723-24 (1976).
80. Id.
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course, requiring that one take difficulties into account does not bar all
differential treatment. Given the cases noted above, one would expect
the Court to apply a reasonably stringent proportionality test to such
differential treatment.
Additionally, the Court has found gender equality to be a fundamental right. Article 119 of the EEC Treaty guarantees both sexes
"equal pay for equal work," and the ECY has held that gender equality
exists as a basic principle. In Razzouk and Beydoun, 81 two widowers

received less generous pensions than widows in their situations would
have received, and the Court held for the widowers on the merits.
Although the Treaties do not expressly state such a rule, the Court held
that this "fundamental right" flowed from article 119.82 The Court's

method is similar to that in Hauer: first induction establishes a general
principle, and then deduction applies it to the instant case. In like manner, the Court has derived "a general principle of non-discrimination"3

from articles 7, 33(1), 36, 40(3), 44(1), 45, and 119 of the EEC Treaty.
Note, however, that the Court's rights activism applies only to the
Community sphere. In the third Defrenne case,"' the Court upheld the

principle of nondiscrimination but noted that it serves only as "a limitation on all Community acts .... [L]egal relationships which are left
within the powers of the national legislature must be understood to be

subject to" national, not Community, safeguards. 8 Although a commentator has raised the specter of the direct effect of general principles of
law, this is not yet the case.3 6 Nonetheless, general principles of law,
81. Case 75/82, Razzouk & Beydoun v. Commission of the European Communities, 1984
E.C.R. 1509.
82. Id. at 1530. Note that the application of one of the widowers, Beydoun, was held to
be inadmissible due to a procedural bar. Id at 1529. See also Case 149/77, Defrenne v. Soci~t6 Anonyme Beige de Navigation Arienne, 1978 E.C.R. 1365, 23 C.M.LR. 312 (1978),
especially at 320-21 (Advocate General Capotorti) and 329 (E.C.J.).
83. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 148.

84. Case 149/77, Defrenne v. Societe Anonym Beige De Navigation Aerienne, 1978
E.C.R. 1365, 23 C.M.L.R. 312 (1978).
85. 1978 E.C.R. at 1378 (E.CJ.), 1385 (Advocate General Capotorti), 23 C.M.LR. at 321
(Advocate General), 329 (E.CJ.) (1978).
86. Weiler, supranote 3, at 1139-41. The Court concurred that, except in the area of pay,
the Community had not "assumed any responsibility for supervising and guaranteeing the
observance of the principle of equality" of the sexes. Defrenne, 1978 E.C.R. at 1378, 23
C.M.L.R. at 329 (1978). The situation is analogous to that in the United States prior to the
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment; until that time the Bill of Rights only applied at the
federal level. Though the Single European Act will lead to a greater range of Community
concerns, the principle of national automony within certain spheres has not yet been questioned and would seem to be unalterable without some further treaty or accord. One may
wonder whether these principles will seep into national law through case law. Courts most
likely will continue to distinguish carefully EC rules (which only apply in specified areas) from
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including human rights, bind the Member States when they implement
Community obligations.8 7

IV.

THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: HISTORICAL
SIMILARITIES TO THE ECJ

Clearly the ECJ's protection of human rights necessarily has re-

sponded in some degree to the realities of a burgeoning political system.
Rasmussen correctly remarks that the EC shares many of "the problems

and structure of the early American polity" and notes that "much of the
constitutional debate which is presently mounting in the European Com-

munity has parallels in US judicial history: federal supremacy, expansion
of central powers," and so on. 8 The original proponents of European

union envisioned a United States of Europe and modelled their system
accordingly. As in Europe, in the thirteen original colonies "vested
rights had grown up" and, because each colony imposed its own tariffs
and controls, there was the "Balkanization of trade and commerce." 89
The U.S. and the EC were both established in response to this economic
chaos and the plethora of barriers to interstate trade. The Commerce
Clause, like the EEC, promoted a common market.9" Both have non-

parliamentary, multiple branch governments involving, at least initially,
vast state autonomy. In both systems, the smaller states feared dominanational law. That is not, however, to say that such seepage is at all inconceivable: Lord
Scarman expects the Continental European methods eventually to supersede those of the common law. Lord Scarman, Common Law or Common Market, in ENGLISH LAW: THE Naw
DIMENSION (1974).
87. On the general principles binding Member States when they enact Community obliga.
tions, see Case 5/88, Wachauf v. State Bundesamt f'tr
Ernahrung und Forstwirtschaft, 60
C.M.L.R. 328 (1991). In that case, the E.C.J. wrote that, in implementing an EC regulation
involving milk quotas, a Member State was bound not to violate human rights (such as depriving one of the fruits of his labors without compensation). See also Cases 201 and 202/85,
Klensch v. Secretaire d'Etat i l'Agriculture et fi
la Viticulture, 1986 E.C.R. 3477 (Article 40(3)
covers all related measures that both the EC and the Member States implement). But see Case
12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwibisch Gmiind, 1987 E.C.R. 3719, 3745-46 (E.C.J. reaffirmed
that Member States are unaffected by the EC doctrine of rights except when implementing EC
law).
88. RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 115. Of course, noteworthy differences exist as well,
including judicial nomination procedures and structure of the court system. See, e.g., Alyssa
A. Grikscheit, Harnessing Fundamental Human Rights to Achieve Integration: The Evolution of the European Court of Justice in Light of the U.S. Federal Experience, 16, 18 (Mar.
1991) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
89. RASMUSSEN supra note 4, at 118.
90. "In the Commerce Clause, [the Framers] provided that the Nation was to be a common market, a 'free trade unit' in which the States are debarred from acting as separate economic entities." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980)
(citations omitted).
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tion by the larger, so both governments embody a weighted voting compromise to protect them. And while the Treaties are more detailed than
the U.S. Constitution,9 1 both are vague in sections and leave much room
for interpretation.
In both systems, federal judges promoted strong central values.
This centralism was bound to conflict with state sovereignty. Like some
of today's Europeans, many Americans believed that "the States were
sovereign afterwards as well as before; and they alone were sovereign
because a partition of sovereignty is impossible."9 2 These states' rights
advocates reasoned that since the validity of the U.S. Constitution rested
upon the consent of states, the federal system's powers must still be subject to those limitations that bind the states,9" much as the early German
plaintiffs kept insisting. Even the more moderate version of interposition
(allowing states to decide to what extent federal law would apply) would
have been incompatible with any workable national government. 94 Thus,
the early Courts sought to establish their supremacy over all other courts
and assert their powers to determine jurisdiction.
Unlike the EC Treaties, the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly
authorize judicial review. In Marbury v. Madison," Chief Justice Marshall used the logic of the supremacy of the Constitution to demonstrate
the need for judicial review and, therefore, its existence. His backhanded
introduction of judicial review, while denying Marbury a writ of mandamus, resembles the ECJ's method of recognizing fundamental rights in
Stauder, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, and Nold No. 2 without
finding actual violations on the facts: both maneuvers deflected criticism
(since the dicta did not affect the results) while at the same time establishing precedent.
Both Justice Marshall and Justice Story supported strong national
authority at the expense of state action just as EC action preempted UK
law in the Kent Kirk case. 96 In Martin v. Hunter'sLessee,97 Justice Story
91. For instance, where the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power "(t]o regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes",
U.S.CoNsT. art. I, § 8(3), the EEC Treaty delves into acceptable tariff percentages and classifications, EEC TREATY art. 78(3), and percentages of financial contributions due from each
Member State, id. art. 200.
92. RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 122.
93. Id. at 122-23.
94. For a discussion of the "truculent" South Carolina doctrine of nullification, which in
its most extreme form "forb[ade] any appeals to the Supreme Court," see Charles Warren,
Legislative and JudicialAttacks on the Supreme Court of the United States: A History of the
Twenty-Fifth Section of the JudiciaryAct, 47 AM. L. REV. 1-34, 161-89, 162, 175 (1913).
95. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
96. Case 63/83, Regina v. Kent Kirk, 1984 E.C.R. 2689, 41 C.M.LR. 522, 538 (1984).
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vigorously upheld the appellate jurisdiction of federal courts over state
courts.9" Perhaps his strongest argument rested upon the need for uni-

formity and harmony of decisions on all constitutional matters throughout the country. Again, the insistence on harmony recalls the ECJ's use

of uniformity as a justification for adjudicating clashes between state and
Community measures.
Article 23599 of the EEC Treaty, which permits action in areas not
otherwise provided for if necessary to achieve the Treaty's ends, is the
analog of the Necessary and Proper Clause. The latter formed the basis

for Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland,1°° which upheld the creation of a national bank. Just as the ECJ has given the Com-

munities substantial leeway, Justice Marshall allowed the national
government breathing room. He declared, "[1]et the end be legitimate,

let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are
appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist[ent] with the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, are
constitutional."' 10 1 Although Rasmussen assails the Court's lenient attitude towards the use of article 235,102 he fails to see that both Justice

Marshall and the ECJ realized the need for flexibility in achieving federal
ends. Timeless documents must be flexible, interpreted according to both

spirit and letter. As Marshall cautioned, "[w]e must never forget that it
is a constitution we are expounding."103
Just as Member State courts have protested against the ECJ's fed-

eral approach, so American state courts rebelled. In the first few decades
of the American republic, state courts repeatedly challenged the Supreme

Court's appellate jurisdiction."

4

Moreover, these problems did not van-

97. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
98. See also U.S. v. Judge Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809) (Chief Justice Marshall
affirmed supremacy by arguing for its necessity).
99. Article 235 provides,
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain, in the course of the
operation of the common market, one of the objectives of the Community and this
Treaty has not provided the necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously
on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly, take the
appropriate measures.
EEC TREATY art. 235.
100. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Rasmussen notes that Kutscher, has defended the
E.C.J.'s activism in McCullochesque language. RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 182. Note also
the resemblance to Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 3 C.M.L.R. 425 (1964).
101. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
102. RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 409.
103. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407 (emphasis in the original).
104. See, eg., Respublica v. Cobbett, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 467 (1798) (Pennsylvania Supreme
Court refused to allow an action to be removed to Federal Circuit Court); Hunter's Lessee v.
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ish completely with the passage of time. In the most notable recent example, state supreme court judges were so incensed by Brown v. Board of
Education10 5 that they claimed the U.S. Supreme Court had usurped
state power and had effectively written their policy preferences into the
Constitution." For the most part, however, the state courts have accepted the federal courts, just as the German courts in WzYnsche have
finally abjured nationalist defiance."17
Additionally, the Warren Court's discovery of a right of privacy in
Griswold'1 ---by examining penumbrae of the Bill of Rights and inductively distilling principles-resembles the inductive derivations of rights
in Watson and Belmann °1 and Defrenne No. 3.0
A key difference between the two judicial bodies is that while the
U.S. Supreme Court applies different tests to liberty and property
rights, 1 1 the ECJ has only one test. Though Stauder involved human
dignity, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Nold No. 2, and Hauer all
recognized the importance of property rights. Throughout all these
cases, there is no sign that the Court views restrictions on property as
any different from restrictions on liberty.
Rasmussen recognizes that "the [Supreme] Court's authority and
legitimacy was never fundamentally weakened or crippled" in political
conflicts."1 2 However, instead of drawing from this the logical conclusion that the ECJ is likely to weather the occasional storm of criticism,
he draws the opposite conclusion. He bases this in part on his assertion
Martin, Devisee, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1815) (Virginia Supreme Court refused to obey U.S.
Supreme Court's overturning of Virginia's decision); Johnson v. Gordon, 4 Cal. 368 (1854)
(California Supreme Court denied U.S. Supreme Court's supremacy). All of the foregoing
cases, along with numerous examples of legislative disobedience and popular unrest, are discussed and cited in Warren, supra note 94, at 4-5, 9-11, 176.
105. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
106. See Charles Alvin Jones (then Chief Justice of Pennsylvania), speech reported in
HARVARD L. RECORD (Oct. 23, 1958), cited and discussed in Walter F. Murphy, Lower Court
Checks on Supreme Court Power, 53 AMER. POLl. Sci. REv. 1017, 1019-20 (1959). See also
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
107. In re Application of Wfinsche Handelsgesellschaft, 50 C.M.LR. 225,265 (BGH 1987)
(F.RG.).
108. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
109. Case 118/75, The State v. Watson & Belman, 1976 E.C.R. 1185, 18 C.M.LR. 552
(1976).
110. Case 149/77, Defrenne No. 3, 1978 E.C.R. 1365, 23 C.M.L.R. 312 (1978).
111. For examples of the multiple levels of scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (per Harlan, J. (dissenting)); Paul A. Freund, The Supreme
Court and FundamentalFreedoms, in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 125-28
(Leonard W. Levy ed., 1967).
112. R.AsMussEN, supra note 4, at 143.
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of the "increasing social indigestibility of pro-central government judicial
activism,"" 3 when in fact the strongest nationalist holdout, Margaret
Thatcher, was forced out of office in part for her anti-Europe stubbornness. As Mendelson notes, "many major constitutional developments
rest on once-debated legal foundations--one thinks of Marbury v.
Madison, for example."1 1 4 If Rasmussen's American parallel demonstrates anything, it shows that activism, even when unpopular, can draw
a nation together.
V.

RASMUSSEN'S VIEWS

Except where noted, most commentators have agreed on the historical description of the case law presented above.1 1 5 There has been very
little explicit evaluation of the ECJ's role, and what little has occurred is
tacitly pro-activism. 6 Much of this changed in 1986, when Hjalte Rasmussen stirred up a storm in the scholarly community by openly criticizing the Court's activism in a number of fields, including human rights, as
"constitutional rewriting" and judicial legislation.1 17
A.

Rasmussen's Critique

Rasmussen maintains that a normative theory of interpretation of
the EC treaties is impossible because of the lack of consensus about union
and the inaccessibility of a unified original intent. Thus, his criticisms of
the Court rely on sociological attempts to measure intolerance and backlash in the literature and statements of national courts. 8 Nevertheless,
where he thinks it feasible, he attempts to divine the intent of the Founders and then bases his analysis of what the Court ought to have done
upon such intent, presumably because original intention can give a text
its proper, objective meaning.11 9 Rasmussen dislikes excessive judicial
discretion and fears that activism is undermining the perception of the
Court's neutrality. His central criticism of activism is that it will lead to
113. Id. at 142. True, levels of nationalism may still be high, but the tide of pan-Europeanism has been increasing. See also Cappelletti, supra note 2.
114. Mendelson, supra note 49, at 162.
115. See, eg., HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 129-52; RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 390-409;
and SCHERMERS, supra note 26, at 23-64.
116. See, eg., RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 154-83, 265 (his literature survey, where the
sources of criticism of activism rest mainly in an "oral tradition" and the occasional written
remark).
117. Id. at 31, 30, 51, 81, 147, 201. He accepts uncontroversial interstitial lawmaking,
118. Hjalte Rasmussen, Between Self-Restraint and Activism: A JudicialPolicyfor the Eu.
ropean Court, 13 EUR. L. REV. 28, 34-35 (1988) [hereinafter Between Self-Restraint].
119. See, eg., RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 62, 390-93, 403, 500 n.50.

1992]

Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence

a national backlash and will cost the Court "authority and legitimacy,"" crippling the judicial branch.
While he admits that the Preambles may offer some limited guidance, he assails the ECJ's use of broad phrases as "seek[ing] inspiration
in guidelines which are essentially political [in] nature and, hence, not
judicially applicable. This is the root of judicial activism which may be
an usurpation of power."'' Viewing majority rule as the norm in all
government, he sees only one justification for judicial review: the filling
of gaps between democratic will and social reality caused by structural
and functional inertia." 2 Any other review, according to Rasmussen, is
antimajoritarian and presumably elitist.
Finally, Rasmussen maintains that in the absence of normative constraints, the Court is essentially and inevitably a political institution.
Hence, it ought to be more open about its policy role without using that
role to undermine the natural rule of majorities."13 Despite words elsewhere to the contrary, Rasmussen is singularly uncomfortable with judicial discretion; if it is to exist at all, he feels, it must be openly political.
Apart from these few suggestions, he offers no theory of how courts
should adjudicate.
To summarize, then, Rasmussen attacks the ECJ on four points: the
heritage and sources upon which its jurisprudence relies, its interpretive
method, the importance of original intent, and the role of policy in its
decisions.
B. Analysis
In response to Rasmussen's first criticism, it is true that the Treaties
do not mandate a jurisprudence of human rights on their face. Yet such
protection of rights complements the text well, given its concern for "essential procedural requirement[s]"' " 4 and "rule[s] of law"'" and "gen120. Id at 10.
121. Id at 62 (emphasis removed).
122. Id at 62-63.

123. Id at 415-18.
124. Rasmussen's silence regarding procedural principles is relevant. We accept procedural principles intuitively as a necessary component of a legal system. The procedural rules

versus substantive rights distinction is, at best, vague and, at worst, untenable. "Procedural"
rules are chosen because they further a substantive conception ofjustice. For instance, one
may view "procedural" safeguards for criminals as protecting basic human dignity. Similarly,
although equality may be a procedural rule, such a supposedly value-free choice rests upon the
recognition of individual worth and fairness. If there is no meaningful difference between the
two kinds of unwritten law, Rasmussen is inconsistent in tacitly accepting the other general

"procedural" principles of law.
125. EEC TREATY art. 173.
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eral principles of law common to the laws of the Member States."1 26
Furthermore, the Preambles, as noted, sketch out a blueprint which can
guide the Court. Rasmussen dismisses the Preambles and broad opening
articles as political rhetoric not fit for general judicial use. Difficulty in
interpreting vague terms, however, is no excuse for ignoring them, and
the Court's interpretation of such clauses as generally binding "statement[s] of legal norms" makes sense. 127 The mission of "the Court of
Justice [is to] ensure that in the interpretation and application of this
'
Treaty the law is observed." 128
Since "the law" is to be applied to the
Treaty, that text implies that the law transcends the clauses. Proof further lies in article 173(1) of the Treaty, which speaks of violations of
"this Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application. 1' 29 Such
rules of law apply to and transcend the Treaties. In light of this broad
language, judges ought to apply Community law as a coherent and principled whole.
The Court tries to create a mosaic patterned by the Treaties. The
EC, as a proto-federal system, has more in common with ordinary nations than with conventional international organizations and thus can
usefully draw upon accumulated national wisdom. For instance, French
law has influenced the EC greatly due to France's important role in setting up the Community, and the Treaties draw heavily upon French legal
terms such as faute de service in article 40(1) of the ECSC Treaty. In
responding to German fears, the Court has drawn more heavily upon
German principles such as legal certainty and proportionality. And the
ECJ's move towards a case-law approach may be explained by the accession of the UK and Ireland, who utilize this approach heavily. The
Court does not pay exclusive attention to the legal principles of larger
nations; cases from the Netherlands, for instance, have produced some
extremely important developments.1 30 Finally, the ECJ may even look
126. EEC TREATY art. 215(2).

127. Cappelletti, supra note 2, at 8 (critiquing Rasmussen's skepticism).
128. EEC TREATY art. 164.

129. (Emphasis added); see HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 129-31 (emphasis added).
130. English law, while not cited quite so frequently, has been important. However, the
Court has rejected the English notion of unlimited Parliamentary sovereignty. Case 81/72,
Re: Civil Service Salaries: EC Commission v. EC Council, 1973 E.C.R. 575, C.M.L.R. 639
(1973)(over Advocate General Warner's objections). For the importance of Dutch law, see,
e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 1, 2
C.M.L.R. 105 (1963) and Case 5/71, Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Schbppenstedt v. Council of the
European Communities, 1971 E.C.R. 975 (Dutch administrative law had a great impact on the
Sch6ppenstedt formula.) It is still too soon to judge the weight of the three countries which
joined most recently (Spain, Portugal, and Greece).
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to non-member Western countries for guidance. 131
The ECJ, in comparing legal systems for inspiration, faces a host of
possible texts and corresponding problems.1 32 For instance, Great Britain has no written constitution; therefore any comparative examinations
must delve into such sources as British practices, customary law, !us
cogens, and international treaties. 133 The variety of legal systems (Ro131. Geoffirey Marshall, remarking upon a recent book by the President of the German
Constitutional Court, notes that the tests of proportionality used by courts in Canada and the
United States are remarkably similar to Germany's tests, as are the weighing and balancing of
competing rights. Geoffrey Marshall, ForDignity and Liberty, THE TIMES LrrERARY SUPP.,
Sept. 21-27, 1990, at 995 (reviewing DONALD KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPuBLc OF GERMANY (1990)).
132. The resolution of this clash does not fit the conflict of laws paradigm. The Court is
creating a new, independent body of law for a new supranational framework and so needs
some rule of inspiration distinct from those which merely select one body of law. Imagine that
a Dutch individual has a complaint against the Italian government which falls within an EC
sphere, such as freedom ofmovement; in such a case, the rule that both parties should be heard
may be applied even though it is found in neither Italian nor Dutch law.
For some insights on the common and dissimilar elements in the various western legal
systems, see id at 995.
133. Akehurst, supra note 38, at 31, 34-35. On customary law and !us cogens see THEODORE MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARLN NoRMS As CUSTOMARY LAw (1989);
and MYREs S. McDOUGAL ET AL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD Punuc ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIGNITY (1980). For further discussion of the Eur. Cony. on M.R., the European Social Charter, and the International Labour
Organisation Convention, see Case 149/77, Defrenne v. Soci&6 Anonyme Beige de Navigation
Aerienne (SABENA) 1978 E.C.R. 1365, 23 C.M.L.R. 312 (1978); and Bernhardt, supra note
15, at 51, 46, where he accepts that international customary law does have an influence but is
unclear as to its extent. Cf the discussion of Transocean Marine, supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (English unwritten natural justice applied). Though common law might
seem to be more difficult to cite, there is at least one judge from each Member State, and the
Advocates General contribute their wisdom, so it would seem that someone (especially the
British judge and perhaps the Irish judge) would know enough to ensure that common law is
not underrepresented, though that fear is quite understandable. Though chambers consisting
of subsets of the full Court hear minor matters, any case raising serious issues of principle or
rights will be heard before the full Court.
On the issue of EC law's similarity to other international organizations, the orthodox view
is that the EC has created a "new legal order" which is both autonomous and fundamentally
different in kind from classical international law. See, eg., Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964
E.C.R. 585, 3 C.M.L.R. 425 (1964); HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 85-87; andDOMINIK LASOK &
J.W. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITES 230 (2d ed. 1976). But, for every orthodoxy, there is of course a heresy. See
Derrick Wyatt, New Legal Order, or Old?, 7 EUR. L. REv. 147, 156-57 (1982), citing PIETER
VAN DrIK, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THE REQUIREMENT OF AN

INTEREST TO SUE 481 (1980). Wyatt's argument is that the conventional view of EC law as a
sui generis system is incorrect. One reason he advances is that the kind of reasoning from
general principles the E.C.J. employs draws upon the same method as found in public international law, such as the "general principles of law recognized by civilised nations" referred to in
article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Id. at 147, 157. He also
avers that the teleological method is employed in international law. Id.
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man-based, common law, French Code, etc.) of Member States is bound

to cause problems. However, the systems have influenced each other (for
example, the importation of French law into England during the Nor-

man Conquest), and there are similarities. Nevertheless, while the common Western heritage of the Member States has led to agreement on

many matters of principle, the detailed implementation of these principles has varied.13
Rasmussen's second criticism, that the Court's interpretive method
is faulty, is similarly shortsighted. As Lord Diplock wrote, "courts by

the very nature of their functions are compelled to act as legislators." 3 '
Rasmussen criticizes the Court's approach, but the "rule of law, not of
men," is an ancient myth. Like scholarship, judging involves sifting and

then evaluating from some perspective. 136 Precedent and codified laws
can never answer all legal questions that possibly could arise. Just as

English judges effectively "resorted to the myth of the common law," the
ECJ answers such questions with general principles of law. 137 Inpursuing guidelines given in the necessarily vague Preambles, the Court must
exercise discretion, just as it must in responding to situations not envisaged by the drafters. 3

The Court is open and consistent about its textually based teleology,
and so its method is principled. The original Treaties foresaw "a destiny
'
henceforward shared" and "a broader and deeper community."139
The
Member States reaffirmed these goals in the Merger Treaty, which

"[r]esolved to continue along the road to European unity," 1" and again
in the Single European Act, which sought "to transform relations as a
134. Bernhardt, supra note 15, at 58-59, 65-67; Dauses, supra note 8,at 407-08 ("liberal
democratic principles" and heritage unite, but method and structure diverge).
135. Lord Justice Diplock, The Courts as Legislators in THE LAWYER AND JUSTICE 263
(Brian W. Harvey ed., 1978). Compare Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219,
17 C.M.L.R. 140 (1976) and Comptoir National Technique Agricole (CNTA) S.A. v. European Community Commission, 1975 E.C.R. 533.
136. RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 31, 62; Cappelletti, supra note 2, at 13.
137. HARTLEY, supra note 3, at 129. See generally JOHN G.A. PoCoCK, THE ANCIENT
CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 30-70 (1957) (all of English common law, even new
powers, ideas and principles, was justified by reference to immemorial custom yet continually
refined by judges in a historically evolving way). For an account of common law development,
see SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENoLISIH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I (2d ed. 1968).

138. The Preambles outline a vision of a just system. Some, but not all, of the principles
needed may be catalogued, but, as new problems arise, we must "[discern] afresh and ...
articulat[e] and [develop] impersonal and durable principles." Henry M. Hart Jr., Foreword:
The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REv. 4, 25 (1959).
139. ECSC TREATY preamble.
140. ECC TREATY preamble.
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whole among their States into a European Union." 14 1 Hence, the texts
embody a commitment to European Union. Since all Member States re-

peatedly have assented to these documents, the Court should uphold the
textually-supported goal of union.142
Though it cannot merely aggregate a hodgepodge of national rules,
the ECJ is correct in safeguarding rights jealously by applying critical
scrutiny to measures violating these rights for some purported general
good. Law is not mathematics, and one cannot lay down rigid rules. 43
Nonetheless, the EC's aims, supra-national situation and vantage; the relative weights of the legal systems and the E.C.H.R.; and a principle's
compatibility with the Treaties all figure in the balance. 1" It is therefore

absurd to reason via the slippery slope145
that any exercise of judicial discretion must result in total discretion.
At first some jurists thought that unwritten law could fill in only
141. SEA preamble.
142. Ofcourse, the issue of teleology has not been resolved definitively. Nonetheless, many
commentators agree with the assertion that "the Community was intended, by at least some of
its founders, to be a first step towards a European federation, a United States of Europe."
HARTY, supra note 3, at 6. The texts of the Treaties embody and express this plan. Not only
do the Merger Treaty and Single European Act reaffirm the Treaties' commitment to union,
but the EC's praise in the form of the Joint Declaration and the Member States' affirmation of
the Preamble to the Single European Act demonstrates that the Court has helped to meet that
goal by filling a deeply felt gap in the Treaty framework. Moreover, despite genuine nationalist fervor, the public support for union has been growing. See, eg., Cappelletti, supra note 2.
Not all share a desire for full union, but most Europeans agree in principle with European
union even when they resist its imposition upon themselves.
143. Despite his hostility to the E.CJ.'s activism, Rasmussen recognizes that "mechanical
jurisprudence is defunct." Between Self-Restraint, supra note 118, at 31.
144. Akehurst, supra note 38, at 33-34, 37; Case 5/71, Aktien-Zuckerfabrik Sch5ppeastedt
v. Council of the European Communities, 1971 E.C.R. 975, 989-90. (Advocate General Roemer suggests that the E.C.J. is free to select the most carefully considered principle).
Ulrich Scheuner, in FundamentalRights in EC Law and in National ConstitutionalLaw.
Recent Decisionsin Italy and in the FederalRepublic of Germany, 12 COMMON MKiT. L REv.
171, 185 (1975) put the point thus:
To evolve common principles from the various constitutional systems of the member
States a comparative method is needed. What does this mean? It is not possible to
transfer definite formulations or details from the one or the other national order...
The general principles observed in the Community must be uniform, [sic] they cannot vary from case to case according to the nationality of the parties concerned. The
comparative analysis cannot cling to particular details, but must follow the general
trend of the evolution of legal prescriptions; it must lead to a result acceptable in all
member States. Its object must be to find the rules best suited to express a common
tradition and compatible with the structure of the Community... They must be
consistent with the basic aims and objectives of the Community. They require, in
one word, transplantation and acclimatization to a new environment.
145. This contention is developed infra at notes 203-17 and the accompanying text.
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"obscurity, insufficiency or gaps in the written law." 146 Now they accept

that such rules may override secondary EC laws but not the Treaties
themselves.147 Not all principles are applied contrary to written law
(contra legem); for instance, the Court only implies force majeure exceptions subordinate to written law (infra legem), using them as default rules
of interpretation. 148 A commentator distinguishes principles contra
legem from those infra legem by finding "an element of justice, fairness
or equity" in the former, terming it "a form of natural law," but he admits that this division is at best inexact.1 49 Of course, principles do not
obviate the need for positive law. For instance, the ECJ refused to create
a statute of limitations, ruling that it had to be enacted as legislation.'
Third, Rasmussen's use of original intent is unpersuasive. He uses
speculation about authorial intention as a foundation for attacks upon
the Court's deviations from the original intent.'51 However, using such
an original intention is neither possible, since the travaux preparatoires
are kept secret, nor desirable. Such speculations as to the contents and
thought processes of the authors are too flimsy to permit any authoritative criticism. Often there is no one reason for having enacted or failed
to enact a provision; the agreement on a form of words can easily conceal
vast differences in substance, and looking at original authorial intent may
cause more problems than it solves.
The intentions that should matter are those manifested in the text,
for the Member States signed documents, not ethereal lists of intentions.
The drafters could not have anticipated all possible situations, but they
laid down principled guidelines and left application to the functionaries
146. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft GmbH v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle
fir Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, 1132, 11 C.M.L.R. 255, 272 (1972) (Advorate General Dutheillet de Lamothe calling this a "good judicial teclnique").
147. L. NEVILLE BROWN & FRANcIs G. JACOBS, THE COURT OF JUSTIcE or THE EC 219

(1977); Akehurst, supra note 38, at 29-30. But see Dauses, supra note 8, at 406-07. Treaty
provisions are unlikely to clash inexorably with a fundamental right. Furthermore, by using
rights as interpretive aids, one can avert clashes. Since these principles form part of the Treaty
context and structure, they do and ought to override subordinate legislation, but only to serve
as a rule of construction for the Treaties.
148. Akehurst, supra note 38, at 47.
149. SCHERMERS, supra note 26, at 26-27.
150. Case 45/69, Boehringer GmbH v. Commission, 1970 E.C.R. 769 (Advocate General
Gand proposed adoption of such a rule; E.C.J. rejected it, but did not discuss what could and
could not be done by the courts. One would hope that they will explicate such guidelines).
This decision signals the Court's clear recognition that many problems fall outside of judicial
competence.
151. RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 26, 390. But whose intentions should count? Drafters?
Ratifiers? Voters? Contemporary commentators? He bases much reasoning on such ethereal
speculation.
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of the EC. Although Advocates General sometimes refer to "original
intent," the Court derives from the text itself what Ronald Dworkin calls
an "institutionalized intention," a hypothetical textual intent rather than

an actual historical belief.' 52 The EC uses the spirit and purpose of the
text as a guide:
In the interpretation of the Communities' founding treaties, no principle is more firmly established than that which commands that each
Article must be interpreted in such a manner as to secure the objects of
the treaty in which it appears...
it forms the very basis of the Court's
1 53
method of interpretation.
The Court is constrained by "the spirit, the general scheme and the
wording," and "the objective" of the Treaties.' 5 4 The ECJ ought not to
contradict the words of the Treaties, but some flexibility is essential to
what aspires to be a timeless document. 55 A constitution is not an ordi-

nary contract: it cannot rest upon the specific intentions of the parties at
the time but must be flexible and general enough to adapt and improve. 156 By "interpreting, supplementing, and integrating" the various
principles and sources of law, the Court may exercise discretion within
152. For an excellent examination of the subject regarding actual and textual intention see
Richard Plender, The Interpretation of Community Acts by Reference to the Intentionsof the
Authors, 2 Y.B. Eor. L. 57, 57-58, 62, 63, 66 (citing Advocate General Mayras's rejection of
actual intent in the Reyners case).
153. Id at 66.
154. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R.
1, 12-13, 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963). Cf Pleader, supra note 152, at 67-78, on international agreements and teleological interpretation.
There is a subtle but powerful point concerning the E.C.J.'s jurisdiction. Since article 164
of the EEC Treaty refers to the interpretation of the Treaty, general principles can thus be used
to interpret the E.C.J.'s own jurisdiction. Letter from Bernard Rudden, Prof. of Comparative
Law, Oxford University, to Steven A. Bibas (Oct. 15, 1990) (on file with the author). Thus, in
Case 294/83, Partie Ecologiste 'Les Verts' (The Greens) v. European Parliament, 1986 E.C.R.
1339, 49 C.M.L.R. 343 (1987), the Court, to avoid "a result which is contrary both to the
spirit of the Treaty as expressed in article 164 thereof and to its overall structure," interpreted
article 173 in such a way as to enlarge its jurisdiction and allow action to be brought against
the European Parliament (though it is not explicitly listed as a potential defendant before the
E.C-I.).
155. See RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 25-31. One certainly may question whether the
Treaties are analogous to a constitution. To borrow an argument from Ronald Dworkin, however, should the Court make the Treaties the best that they can be (i.e. most efficacious at
securing the ends they were designed to achieve). See generally RONALD DwowmN, LAw's
EMPIRE (1986).
156. See, e.g., The Legal Tender Cases, 110 U.S. 421, 439 (1884) ("A constitution, establishing a frame of government, declaring fundamental principles, and creating national sovereignty, and intended to endure for ages and to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs, is not to be interpreted with the strictness of a private contract").
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principled textual and contextual constraints.157
Rasmussen's fourth concern, the Court's supposed tendency to become embroiled in politics and policy, is thus allayed by such constraints.
The Court's outlook stems from the Treaties which the Member States
ratified; hence, although "the vision of a great court, of course, should
itself not be arbitrary,... such a vision, far from being arbitrary, is fully

legitimate, for it is rooted in the text." 15 Although the Court may involve itself in politics, raising fears of judicial tyranny, the texts both
constrain discretion and legitimate principled activism taken in furtherance of the broad aims of the Treaties.
Rasmussen also continually worries about public perceptions of the
'
ECJ's "authority and legitimacy."159
The carefully timed and staged introduction of general principles beginning in Stauder, however, shows
care in averting such crises. At the same time, the ECJ has avoided becoming enslaved by public opinion. Curiously, Rasmussen assails this
careful progression as "an authority-consuming judicial vacillation."1' 0
Certainly, a court ought not to usurp power and become unelected tyrants, but any court upholding its mission is bound to draw complaints
and, at times, impede the will of the majority. As Cappelletti notes, "[i]t
is one of the most important virtues of the judicial function generally,
and of judicial review especially, not to be strictly bound to the environment's powers and pressures." 16' Otherwise, minority rights would be at
risk. Rasmussen, justifying judicial review entirely in terms of the gap
between democratic will and reality, falls into the trap of pure majoritarianism. He fails to see that protection of minorities from majority tyranny is a more important justification, especially when that protection is
unpopular.
Rasmussen's majoritarian outlook faces three basic problems. The
first is that the only democratically chosen body in the EC, the Parliament, is virtually powerless. The Court is, therefore, not being antidemocratic. Second, democratic or republican institutions do not
always reflect the beliefs of the people. Minority special interests and
factions, insufficient information, infrequent voting, and other barriers
157. Plender, supra note 152, at 103.
158. Cappelletti, supra note 2, at 8. For support of the public opinion contention, see
Mauro Cappelletti, The "Mighty Problem" ofJudicialReview and the Contributionof Comparative Analysis, 2 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTEGRATION 1 (1979).
159. RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 10.

160. Id. at 390.
161. Cappelletti, supra note 2, at 6 (emphasis in the original). He cites John Hart Ely and
Alexander Bickel in support of his view that the judiciary must in some ways be a buffer
against unbridled majoritarian rule.
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make true representation difficult. Third, and most important, there is
the Madisonian dilemma: even if all practical problems with democracy
could be swept away, courts would be needed to protect minority rights.
The ECJ must ensure that the EC bureaucracy respects individual rights.
Our society values individuals not merely as voting members of a majority, but as worthwhile humans in their own right with moral autonomy
and certain rights. 62 For this protection to remain meaningful, courts

must keep pace with the growth and development of the other branches;
otherwise, the balance of powers will be thrown askew.
In summary, consistent, purposive activism provides an alternative
to deferring to the whim of unelected Eurocrats. It fills bureaucratic and
democratic gaps, protects minority rights, and promotes the goals of the
Treaties. Rasmussen invokes original intent to criticize such activism,
but he can only speculate as to what that original intent might be and
then use these guesses to attack the Court's attempts to create a workable
Community system.' 6 3 He complains of perceived problems of legitimacy, yet the only alternative he offers, namely a fully politicized judiciary, is unacceptable. Since discretion and perspective are inherent in
judging, Rasmussen ought to accept that these factors exist, suggest their
proper scope, and formulate a normative account of how judges should
judge. However, he fails to address this synthetic task.
VI.
A.

THE AMERICAN LESSON: BORK'S
INTERPRETATION

Bork's Attack on Judicial Activism

Unlike Rasmussen, Robert Bork does not worry that activism will
undermine a court's authority. On the contrary, what concerns him is
that "the [Supreme] Court is virtually invulnerable... [and] can do what
it wishes, and there is almost no way to stop it." 6 ' As such, judges are
free "to impose [their] morality upon us" and reason backwards to
162. For example, the rights not to be killed, robbed, tortured, etc.
163. See, eg., RASMUSSEN, supra note 4, at 28, 390; and his assaults upon such essential
landmarks as Van Gend en Loos. Ii at 26, 30, 31, 37, 51, 147, 201. Rasmussen has not
"offerled] a systematic, coherent theory of the nature ofjudicial interpretation" as a substitute.
A.G.Toth, Book Review, 7 Y.B. EUR. L 411, 412 (1987) (reviewing HIALTE RASMUSSEN,
ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE (1986)).

164. BoRK, supra note 5, at 77. For more comprehensive treatments of Bork's thought in
critical context, see, e.g., Ronald M. Dworkin The Bork Nomination, 9 CARDOZO L REV. 101

(1987) (symposium issue on the Bork nomination); and Gary McDowell et al., The Judicial
Record ofJudge Robert Bork A ConstitutionalInquiry, 3 BENCHMARK 119 (1987). For analyses of the course of his thought, see, eg., Peter Philips, A Study of Robert Bork, 19 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 425 (1987) (includes thorough bibliography and sources); and James Wilson, Justice Difo
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achieve desired results. 6 Judges rewrite the Constitution to include
"their own subjective sympathies" and "judicially fashionable freedoms."' 6 6 Thus "law is being seduced by politics and thereby losing its
integrity as a discipline."16' 7
Bork argues that the revisionists "prefer results to everything else,
including democracy and respect for the legitimacy of authority" and
majority rule. 168 They seek to remove policy disputes :rom the legislative
sphere and to solve them through judicial activism. Such judges frustrate
majority will, undermine the constitutionally mandated democratic
processes, and destroy "the basic American plan: representative democracy." 169 This approach also undermines impartial adjudication, since it
encourages reasoning backwards from the desired result instead of deductively proceeding from the neutral principles that the Constitution
1 70
embodies.
The many revisionist theories of constitutional interpretation that
purport to constrain judicial discretion ultimately provide no constraints,
Bork argues. Moral philosophy is inadequate, since it is based upon personal views rather than objective tests, and no moral philosophy commands a consensus.171 History and tradition are far too broad and varied
to confine a judge. Judges can emphasize selectively those elements
(whether for liberty or authority) that conform to their personal
prejudices and so find bases for almost any result.1 71 Bork contends that
even if judges were to use these various methods, they lack special training in these disciplines and so are no more competent to arbitrate such
issues than are the people speaking through their elected representatives.
In short, Bork argues that "[a] robe is entirely irrelevant to the worth or
173
power of one's moral views."'
Hence, Bork defends the use of original understanding on grounds
of necessity, since he believes it is the only neutral and workable system.' 74 The judge thereby avoids engaging in political choices or debates
about levels of abstraction, merely applying the choices of the Founders.
fused: A Comparison of Edmund Burke's Conservatism with the Views of Five Conservative
Academic Judges, 40 U. MIAMI L. Rrv. 913, 943 (1986).
165. BoRK, supra note 5, at 69-70, 252.
166. Id at 58, 261.
167. Id. at 262.
168. Id at 131, 171.
169. Id at 49.
170. Id at 262.
171. Id at 121, 252.
172. Id. at 235.
173. Id at 124-25. Cf id at 190-91.
174. Id. at 155.
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This method rests upon "what the public of the time would have understood the words to mean" as manifested in the contemporaneous newspapers, debates, dictionaries, and other such sources, as well as in the text
and structure of the document itself. In other words, Bork seeks an objective understanding instead of any particular subjective intention.' 7 5
Just as a contract is construed according to the original understanding of the parties, so the Constitution should be read, claims Bork.
Though he admits that the Constitution may require a less "narrow, legalistic" reading than ordinary laws, he insists that the basic standard is
the same as that for "other legal texts: the original meaning of the
words." 17' 6 However, he also believes that "the Constitution states its
principles in majestic generalities that we know cannot be taken as
sweepingly as the words alone might suggest." 1 " Because original understanding is the only fixed understanding superior to that of the judge,
Bork proclaims it to be the only method of constraining judicial whims.
He recognizes that "the result of the search [for original understanding] is never perfection; it is simply the best we can do." 1 78 While he
admits that the same principles may be applied to new, unforeseen instances (as with the Fourth Amendment's extension to electronic surveillance) and that judges must develop doctrine in borderline cases, as when
no case in point exists, such development differs from creating new constitutional principles.17 9 In areas of silence, "judges must stand aside and
let current democratic majorities rule, because there is no law superior to
theirs. , 180
Bork's treatment of the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments, potential vehicles for fundamental rights jurisprudence, illustrates the ramifications of his method of interpretation. He interprets the Fourteenth
Amendment solely according to its presumed purpose of protecting exslaves and thus extends it only to cases of racial equality. 8 1 And
although the congressional sponsors of the Fourteenth Amendment cited
'1 8 3
Corfield v. Coryell' 82 for a broad list of "privileges and immunities,"
175. Id at 144, 165.
176. Id at 145.
177. Id at 147.
178. Id at 163.
179. Id at 167-69 (citing his own opinion in Oiman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995-96 (D..
Cir. 1984) (en bane) (Bork, J., concurring)).
180. Id at 167.
181. Id at 180.
182. Corfield v. Coryei, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230).
183. See, eg., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765-66 (1866) (remarks of Sen.
Howard).
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Bork brushes that decision aside as "singularly confused."' 84 Instead, he
applauds the desuetude of the privileges and immunities clause, contending that it ought to remain "a dead letter."1 8 Similarly, Bork argues
that the Ninth Amendment merely acknowledges state constitutional,
statutory, and common-law rights and was meant to ensure that federal
rights would not alter the scheme of rights at the state level. t8 6 After all,
he reasons, the Founders foresaw the judiciary as the weakest branch and
so would not have enabled it to create new constitutional rights.
Bork views vague areas, such as these Amendments, as the most
serious threat to his narrow originalist reading. He responds that judges
must ignore overly broad constitutional provisions:
There being nothing to work with, the judge should refrain from working. A provision whose meaning cannot be ascertained is precisely like
a provision that is written in Sanskrit or is obliterated past deciphering
by an ink blot. No judge is entitled to interpret an ink blot on the
ground that there must be something under it."'
In many ways, Bork's powerful theory agrees with common sense
and makes explicit many of Rasmussen's assumptions. Essentially, both
argue that any departure from original understanding enmeshes the
judge in policy decisions and turns the courts into an unelected legislature. Both rest crucial arguments upon majoritarianism. While Rasmussen's concern that activist courts will lose legitimacy seems unfounded,
Bork's observations about an invulnerable Court and the concomitant
political usurpation are far more compelling.
B.

Critique of Bork's Theories

Many objections to theories of original intent-such as problems in
determining whose subjective intentions should control, discovering
whether they intended that their intentions matter, and ascertaining
those subjective understandings-do not apply to Bork's version, since
he does not rely on subjective intentions.' 8 Another criticism comes
from skeptics who object that the wishes of the dead cannot bind the
184. BORK, supra note 5, at 181 (referring to Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52
(C.C.E.D.Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230), which lists privileges and immunities as encompassing,
among others, life, liberty, property, happiness, safety, movement, trade, judicial redress, the
franchise, and governmental protection).

185. Id. at 166.
186. Id. at 184-85.
187. Id. at 166.
188. A subjective intention is one which a particular person actually held at a particular
time. In contrast, Bork's objective original intent rests upon the way that contemporaries
would have understood the document in question.
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living. Such arguments, however, provide no reason to extend individual
rights. One cannot argue against the Constitution's legitimacy while
seeking to extend the document's protections. Neither may objections
based on current moral consensus justify judicial activism. If a consensus develops that the Constitution does not go far enough, new rights
may be created through amendments or legislation.
Serious problems with Bork's theories of interpretation remain. One
difficulty is that discovering the original understanding involves
problems of textual sources and reconciling conflicting intentions. "A
number of constitutional phrases cannot intelligibly be given content
solely on the basis of their language and surrounding legislative history."' 18 9 Many provisions are not only vague, but also ambiguous. Furthermore, when interpreting these provisions, there may be difficulty in
fixing levels of abstraction.190 Often, written words conceal papered-over
disagreements. 19' The text itself, then, is "just what there was sufficient
agreement on to gain majority consent,"' 9 2 and contemporaries clearly
held multiple interpretations of the words finally used. This plethora of
historical views "may well increase confusion rather than understanding.' 1 93 Bork might respond by claiming that we should use sufficiently
specific intentions where available and otherwise refer matters back to
the legislature. To do so, he would still have to step out of his guise of
originalist neutrality and argue the merits of majority rule by default versus judicial construction, rather than using the originalist veneer for
claiming that his is the only legitimate construction.
Though Bork's views on the Fourteenth Amendment at first seem to
tally with its logic and history, his reading ignores the broad import of
the words. The drafters of that provision could have tailored it very nar189. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 12

(1980). Ely also claims that "the document itself and a 'framers' dictionary'" will not suffice.
Idkat 13.
190. Paul Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy: EssentialContradictionsof Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1092 (1988), gives as an example "the
general principle of equality which applies to all cases" (a principle Bork had articulated in
Robert Bork, NeutralPrinciplesand Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 14-15
(1971)). Brest notes that one could read this principle as one of equality for blacks only, racial
equality, or a general equality embracing such classifications as gender and sexual orientation.
191. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPRFME COURT
AT THE BAR OF PoLrncs 105 (2d ed. 1986).
192. ELY, supra note 189, at 17.
193. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 27 (1985). On the contrary, the Founders were highly
wary of majoritarianism and sought to avoid leaving lots of powers to the majority; hence the
Congress's powers in the Constitution are more limited than those of the other two branches:
"All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress ..... U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 1. (emphasis added). See also infra note 200 and accompanying text.
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rowly had they wanted to.19 4 Nonetheless, Bork strives to use some history to narrow it himself. He shows his use of original understanding to
be selective when he dismisses Corfield v. Coryell and treats the privileges

and immunities clause as a "dead letter." His construction of the Ninth
Amendment is similarly illogical because it renders the Amendment
completely irrelevant to both federal and state governments and duplicative of the Tenth Amendment's reservation of state autonomy. One
scholar, Randy E. Barnett, has proposed a far more plausible reading

rooted in "the then-prevailing beliefs in rights antecedent to government." 195 These rights would limit the government t s permissible ends
and means, either as rights drawn from constitutional history and philosophy, or more usefully as "a general constitutional presumption in favor
196
of individual liberty."
Open-ended sections like the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments
indicate that the Constitution cannot be limited by narrow originalist
reasoning. As John Hart Ely has remarked, "the Constitution turns out
to contain provisions instructing us to look beyond their four cor194. For an example of wording tailored to a particular group, see U.S. CONSTITUTION art.
I, § 2, cl. 3, which "exclud[es] Indians not taxed."
195. Randy E. Barnett, Introduction:James Madison'sNinth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS
RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 13
(Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989). Barnett also notes that the Ninth Amendment's desuetude is no
reason to ignore it; after all, no Congressional statute had been struck down on First Amendment grounds until 1965. Id at 28 n.79 (citing Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301
(1965)).
196. Id at 13, 35-44. One reply Bork could make is that, since no one believes in natural
rights any more, claims of "rights retained by the people" still degenerate into subjective moral
sympathies. But this step would require him to selectively denigrate one portion of original
understanding and so undermine the supposed unique neutral integrity of his theory (for "natural rights" are no ink blots; we can ascertain their content as understood by the Framers in
light of the Enlightenment philosophers). Furthermore, the burden is then upon him to show
that rights of life, liberty, property, happiness, and the like are no longer believed in. But
while, at first, some people may deny the existence of rights, on deeper inspection these same
people will protest that one ought not torture or kill the innocent, not because these things
have no utility but because it is wrong to do it to a human. Further, contrary to Ely's suggestion that a provision embodying natural rights is like a provision protecting ghosts and so
ought to be ignored, Ely, supra note 189, at 18, Randy Barnett argues that, even if one is a
philosophical skeptic, rights are a sort of embedded mistake which can retain specific force as
part of a constitutional framework even if the beliefs behind them have faded. Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 28 n.92 (1988).
Also, reading them out of the Constitution would skew the governmental balance and
safeguards so carefully set up in the Constitution. See Barnett, supra note 195, at 34. To
extend the structural argument, one may view rights in purely practical terms as a way of
checking legislative majorities. See infra note 202 and accompanying text. The insulation of
judges can enable them to act as a kind of Burkean historical filter (since the judicial power is
in essence negative and acts as a veto upon laws). If Bork were truly faithful to originalism, he
would welcome this restraint upon majority will.
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ners."' 197 The English experience had taught the Founders that law is
not limited to written legislation. Alexander Hamilton, speaking for
most of his contemporaries, observed that "[i]n disquisitions of every
kind, there are certain primary truths, or first principles, upon which all

subsequent reasonings must depend," such as the rule that "the means

ought to be proportioned to the end."' 98 Even if not codified, these principles underlie our legal system. 199 Hence, originalism does not provide
Bork with a complete, self-contained method of interpretation.

Contrary to Bork's assertion, the Constitution has not been
drenched with ink. As already noted, textual and historical meanings
adhere to the privileges and immunities clause and to the Ninth Amendment. The text, its structure and history, and the aims of government

inform us of possible interpretations. Bork's real reason for denigrating
certain provisions seems not to be difficulty in translating "Sanskrit" but
an arbitrary preference for leaving most matters to majority will. Hence,
he ignores or seeks to delete anti-majoritarian constitutional provisions
like the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Ironically, original intent does not seem to support this majoritarian
preference. The Founders did not embrace democracy and majority rule
eagerly. In upholding inalienable rights, they sought to limit the tyranny

of the majority over minorities. They saw the danger of "an interested
and over-bearing majority" trampling upon "the rules ofjustice, and the
rights of the minor party," especially property rights. 200 While people
may recognize the demands of justice in the abstract, they often pass

"unjust and partial laws"201 in pursuing their immediate self-interest.

Judges, given their impartial deliberation, ought to "mitigat[e] the severity and confin[e] the operation of such laws."2 °2 Judges who occasionally
197. ELY, supra note 189, at 38.
198. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 147 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloired., 2d ed. 1987)
(note the similarity to the E.C.J.'s acceptance of proportionality). See also James Wilson (one
of the first U.S. Supreme Court Justices), I THE WORcs OF JAMES WILSON, 64, 66, 107 (natural law), 256, 274-75 (first principles based on common sense and reason), 263 (skepticism is
self-destructive) (1804); II THE WORmS OF JAMES WILSON, 453 (natural rights), 466 (safeguarding natural rights is the principal object of any legitimate government).
199. See, eg., LON L. FULLER, THE MORAIrrY OF LAW 51 (2d ed. 1969). Since the
Constitution does not include the requirement of proportionality, on Bork's reading we must
either a) claim that it does not exist and allow factions to enact disproportionate legislation, or
b) find it to be an unwritten presupposition: but once we find such a presupposition, other
presuppositions of rights must be admitted to the Ninth Amendment. For a discussion of the
uncodifiability of such rules, see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
200. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), supra note 198, at 41, 43 (citing debtor
relief laws, etc.).
201. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 198, at 401.
202. Id.Bork's only reply is that the Founders could not possibly have meant to turn over
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defy majority will to defend oppressed minorities obey their higher calling as envisioned by the Founders. Bork's majoritarianism is grounded

not in history but in ideological prejudice.
Even if Bork's use of history were not selective and colored by his
blind faith in majority rule, he could not escape the specter of discretion.
First, although he claims that a judge can be neutral by applying choices

already made for him, Bork, in reading the text narrowly, has made a
political choice. As Richard Posner has recognized, "[R]eading is not a
form of deduction; understanding requires a consideration of consequences.... Even the decision to read the Constitution narrowly, and
thereby 'restrain' judicial interpretation, is not a decision that can be read
directly from the text."'2 0 3 Bork has affirmatively chosen originalism and

must defend it on its merits; he cannot treat his choice as uniquely apolitical. Second, "all adjudication requires making choices among the levels
of generality on which to articulate principles, and all such choices are

inherently non-neutral." ' 2"4
Certainly, there have been isolated instances of overly political judg-

ing. But using this complaint to argue for eliminating all judicial discretion is an illogical version of the slippery slope argument, an absurd
reductio ad absurdum.

The solution is not to search for the Holy Grail of unattainable
mechanical jurisprudence but to recognize the ultimate end or purpose
(telos) of our government and to adjudicate with those principles in
mind. For instance, the Declaration of Independence and the Preamble

to the Constitution both outline a broad vision of government which
ought to enlighten interpretation. Another originalist, Lino Graglia,
nevertheless has dismissed the Preamble as a "rhetorical flourish. 20 5
large amounts of power to judges. He seems to forget that the judicial power is merely negative and reactive. So long as government stays fairly limited and within the bounds of powers
set out, as was true of the early government, there is no need for vigorous judicial enforcement.
Once the government's sphere of operations grows, increasing judicial scrutiny serves to maintain the balance of powers. See Barnett, supra note 195, at 27-29.
203. Richard A. Posner, What Am I? A Potted Plant? THE Nitw REPUBLIC, Sept. 28,
1987, at 24. He adds that "[t]he Constitution does not say, 'read me broadly' or 'read me
narrowly.'" Id. at 24-25. Other considerations must inevitably come into play.
204. Brest, supra note 190, at 1091-92; accord Laurence Tribe & Michael Dorf, Levels of
Generality in ConstitutionalLaw, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1057 (1991). Bork wonders why there is
so much theoretical debate about how to approach the Constitution. BORK, supra note 5, at
133. The very plasticity and ambiguity of the text demand the kinds of hard choices to which
Bork is oblivious. What Bork has actually done is assumed without argument that everyone
ought to share the same majoritarian assumptions that he does. His case may indeed be defen.
sible on other grounds but is untenable on originalist grounds.
205. Lino A. Graglia, Would the Court Get 'ProceduralDue Process'Cases Right f/lt Knew
What 'Liberty'ReallyMeans? I NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.POL'Y 813, 815 (1985). As
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Originalists reject such guidelines because they do not like the potential
results. Bork asserts, "The Constitution states its principles in majestic
generalities that we know cannot be taken as sweepingly as the words
alone might suggest."2 ' 6 What "we know," like Bork's ink-blot theory,
becomes a way to ignore inconvenient sections: opening statements of
principle, the Ninth Amendment, and parts of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
VII. IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL SCRUTINY: A
PURPOSIVE THEORY OF INTERPRETATION
Bork and Rasmussen essentially view constitutions as contracts the
interpretation of which should be limited to the express wording and the
views of contemporary parties. But, as pointed out earlier, constitutions
are meant to be timeless and must be read in a more liberal fashion. As
Bickel notes, constitutional "construction involves hospitality to large
purposes, not merely textual exegesis. '20 7 In adjudication, rights and the
demands of justice also should enter into play. A judge's "own convictions about justice or wise policy are constrained by his overall interpretive judgment, not only by the text of the statute but also by a variety of
' 20 8
considerations of fairness and integrity.
The solution to illuminating the purposes of constitutions while
avoiding subjective judging is to employ principled judicial scrutiny
based upon individual rights and liberties. 2 09 The purpose of government
is to protect and serve individual citizens. Even Robert Bork once advocated such an approach; he suggested that a "legitimate judicial activism" would give "content to the concept of natural rights in a case-bycase interpretation of the Constitution." 210
Any method of textual interpretation depends upon judges of integrity who act in good faith. A judge bent on achieving a set result can
Charles Murray notes, the phrase "the pursuit of happiness" in the Declaration of Independence was not "a rhetorical flourish to round out the clause. ... [lit was obvious to [the Founders] that the pursuit of happiness is at the center of man's existence, and that to permit man
to pursue happiness is the central justification of government." CHARLES MuRRAY, IN PURsuIT: OF HAPPINESS AND GOOD GOVERNMENT 24 (1988) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 62
(James Madison)).
206. BoRy, supra note 5, at 147 (emphasis added).
207. BicKEL, supra, note 191, at 36.
208. DwoRKiN, supra note 155, at 380.
209. For a good pricis and defense of principled judicial activism, see, e.g., STEPHEN
MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1987).
210. Robert H. Bork, The Supreme CourtNeeds a New Philosophy, FORTUNE, Dec. 1968 at
138, 170.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 15

twist even originalism-for instance, Bork's reading of the privileges and
immunities clause. Certain matters clearly fall within the public
sphere, 21 1 and governments must be able to act in ways that displease
some people. But when these actions interfere with individual autonomy,
the courts should apply critical scrutiny to ensure that a compelling governmental objective justifies the measure.
While constitutions may include majority rule, one ought not to
view majoritarianism as an overriding universal principle. Numerical superiority does not equal complete license to dominate others. As long as
we value individuals, some spheres must be reserved for individual autonomy, and the scope of such spheres must be defined by a body "not
'2 12
[beholden] to the views of a local or transient political majority."
This function belongs to judges. "Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts the capacity to appeal to men's better
natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in
the hue and cry" of a self-interested legislative fracas.21 3 The courts thus
remind us of shared principles, such as freedoms of speech and of assembly, which we momentarily may lose sight of, as when an unpopular
group wishes to hold a demonstration.
They should do so without discriminating against unfashionable
rights. As noted, the ECJ has not differentiated standards among liberties. Bork rightfully complains of the meager protection afforded to economic rights relative to other human rights.214 Courts ought not enforce
liberties selectively but should instead scrutinize all alleged violations
and protect all rights in a principled, uniform fashion.
Judges ought to base their decisions on the principles underlying the
constitutional system. Despite many differences, most of us in the Western tradition share "allegiance to a limited number of broad first principles concerning the ends of government. ' 215 Bork used to acknowledge
that "our constitutional liberties arose out of historical experience and
out of political, moral, and religious sentiment," but he leaped from there
to a non sequitur: "they do not rest upon any general theory. ' 21 6 Our
history and morality teach us that, as a general rule, individuals have
211. One could argue that almost any legislative measure touches upon a public sphere.
But courts should scrutinize the genuineness and actual weight of the alleged public interest;
otherwise, any legislation could claim a fictitious public interest and so pass scrutiny.
212. DWORKIN, supra note 155, at 377.
213. BICKEL, supra note 191, at 26.
214. BORK, supra note 5, at 61-62.
215. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 142 (1975).
216. ROBERT H. BORK, TRADITION AND MORALITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 8 (1984)

(pamphlet in the Francis Boyer Lectures on Public Policy).
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rights and ought to be respected. They must be treated as ends in themselves and not merely means. Respect for individual rights underpins
our Enlightenment heritage and our form of government.
Critics might attack this approach and claim that, in a fragmented,
heterogeneous society, no monolithic heritage exists. Our society often
seems fragmented and lacking consensus, but our common principles become apparent when we contrast our values with those of a radically
different culture. Bork's practical skepticism on this count ought not
make us shrink from seeking fundamental principles. Judges can and do
vote for results which they personally abhor.21 7 Rather than causing us
to abandon the enterprise completely, Bork's warning should caution us
to beware of our prejudices in using history, tradition, and philosophy.
The judiciary also serves as an additional counterweight to legislative expansion unforseen by the Founders; its protection of rights can
function as a second line of defense against expanding government
power. In a limited government, judicial review would not be very important, but, as centralization increases, the courts can serve as an effective watchdog. As Mauro Cappelletti notes in observing the EC, "the
ever increasing powers of the legislative and executive branches justify,
indeed demand, a parallel growth of the judicial power to preserve a balanced system. This is an inevitable tenet of 'checks and balances.' ii=
Hence, as EC union has increased, the ECJ concomitantly has had to
step up its scrutiny of the exercise of centralized powers.
Because of their indirect relation to the political branches, the courts
may distill general principles without immediate political fear. While
courts are insulated, they are still a part of the government, and the Constitution is superior to the entire government. Paradoxically, impartial
adjudication may flourish because the other parts of government retain
extreme checks upon the courts (such as impeachment, constitutional
amendment, and possible removal of appellate jurisdiction under Article
III, Section 2 of the Constitution in the U.S. and Member State backlash
in the E. 21 9 Because such measures exist yet are rarely used, the courts
217. See ag., West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (Frankfirter, J., dissenting). As a Jew, Frankfurter personally abhorred the law in question but felt
that Constitutional principles bound him to uphold it. While Frankfurters legal reasoning is
questionable, his vigorous dissent proves that, though they may not be perfect at doing so,
judges can, with some success, strive to disassociate personal policy views from legal views.
218. Cappelletti, supra note 2, at 23.
219. Note that several Supreme Court decisions have been overturned by constitutional
amendments. See, eg., Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (overturned by the
Eleventh Amendment); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (overturned by
the Reconstruction Amendments); Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601
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are, within reason, free from immediate political pressures and can reflect
society's deeper moral principles. They will of course make unpopular
decisions, but so will legislators. Furthermore, the powers of appoint-

ment, advice, and consent can ensure that judges have records of integrity, brilliant intellect, and thoughtfulness.

Occasional flaws in the

process may reflect the infirmities of the legislative and executive
branches in carrying out their appointment functions; if so, this is certainly no argument for returning power to those branches. 220

VIII.

CONCLUSION

The outlook for the European Court of Justice is bright. Filled with
national jurists of first-rate intellect and reputation, the ECJ has contributed to the survival and flourishing of the fledgling European Community. It has worked closely with the national courts in handling

preliminary references while asserting its supreme jurisdiction when circumstances have demanded it. It has also made use of the diverse traditions of the Member States, thereby reaping the benefits of legal
pluralism and weaving all of the national strands into a rich international
tapestry. Consequently, it has received plaudits from both commentators
and the rest of the EC, and obedience and cooperation from the national
courts.2 2 1

As political integration looms, much hinges on the desires of the
Member States as expressed in the European Political Cooperation arena

set up by the Single European Act.222 Because of linguistic and cultural
differences, the European states will likely retain far more national au-

tonomy than did the American states. In the U.S., the Fourteenth
Amendment proved critical to many decisions allowing national en(1895) (overturned by the Sixteenth Amendment); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970)
(overturned by the Twenty-Sixth Amendment).
220. Some academics criticize the history of judicial appointments in America, but for
every bad political selection there have been scores, if not hundreds, of highly qualified jurists
appointed. The Senate confirmation process, combined with the ABA rating system, generally
weeds out the bad eggs; similarly, the EC has selected notable legal minds for the E.C,.
Those who criticize the flaws of the selection process refer to the politicization of that process
occasioned by the contentious nomination of Robert Bork himself. In the life of a great Court,
we must defer judgment to the long term. It is doubtful that the absurd and extreme politiciza.
tion of the Court will not endure. Moreover, if Bork wishes to leave such issues to the majority, one could argue that this very infrequent politicization amounts to majority rule on those
issues not commanding any semblance of a consensus.
221. See Joint Declaration, supranote 71, and In Re: The Application of Wiinsche Handelsgesellschaft, 50 C.M.L.R. 225, 265 (BGH 1987)(Germany).
222. European Political Cooperation is the name given to the regular meetings and informational exchanges of the twelve Member States.
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croachments upon state powers. Since no counterpart to the American
Civil War-viewed as the defeat of states' rights t m -- seems likely in Europe, the prospect of an EC "Fourteenth Amendment" seems dim. But
just as the Commerce Clause permitted many New Deal programs to
restrict state autonomy, 224 we may expect that the economic autonomy
of the Member States will continue to diminish.
The ECJ will continue its Griswold-like distillation of rights.' And, finally, the people of Europe will undoubtedly demand that, as EC
power grows, the directly elected European Parliament be given a far
larger role than the token one it now holds." 2
The ECI's derivation of human rights and general principles shows
how a principled judicial activism, based in law, history, and morality,
can fill a deeply felt gap in a legal system. And like the ECJ, the U.S.
Supreme Court has pursued with great success the ends set out for our
government. Both courts have sought to protect individuals, although
one would hope that the U.S. Supreme Court will follow the ECJ's lead
in protecting all such rights consistently.
Bork and Rasmussen have offered criticisms which are ultimately
unpersuasive. They share unrealistic ideas of how courts should operate
and ignore the virtues of an insulated counterweight to majority rule.
This Comment has viewed the systems side by side in an attempt to highlight the creative and purposive nature of adjudication and to undermine
the myth of original understanding. In its place, we must view judging in
light of the constitutional text, its structure, and its overarching purposes. And judges, detached from the political hurly-burly and capable
of taking a longer-term perspective, can best assure the respect for the
individual which is so vital to a healthy society.
223. Confederate political philosophy rested upon "the absolute sovereignty of the states."
RIcHmoND ENQUIRER, Jan. 28, 1863, March 19, 1863, cited in Warren,supra note 94, at 187.
224. See, e.g., Wickard v. Flburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942).
225. One can only wonder how the E.C.J. would react to an Advocate General's drawing
an American parallel to illustrate the use of a method or principle such as this one.
226. In response to these unpopular demands, the current Intergovernmental Conferences
(on reforming the EC) are debating expanding the Parliament's role. A substantial number of
Member States favor such a change. Letter from Alyssa A. Grikscheit to Steven A. Bibas 3
(Aug. 24, 1991) (on file with the author).

